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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2007, the National Rifle Association and the Brady Campaign to
Prevent Gun Violence shared a rare moment of agreement. The U.S.
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in District of Columbia v. Heller, both
organizations declared, brought before the Court the most important Second
Amendment case in history.' For the first time since its 1939 decision in
United States v. Miller, the Court squarely confronted the scope and
meaning of the Second Amendment, and did so by reinterpreting this once-
neglected area of constitutional law. For the District of Columbia itself, the
case introduced a watershed moment-a determination of whether its
longstanding handgun ban and regulation of other firearms would stand or
fall, and thus a determination of its autonomy to legislate for the health and
welfare of its citizens. Yet for the rest of the nation, I contend, Heller
simply does not represent the transformative moment in constitutional
interpretation that both sides of the gun policy debate may hope it to be.
Whether the "right to bear arms" guaranteed by the Second
Amendment is an "individual" right or a "collective" right2-the
* District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)
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1. See David B. Kopel, The Supreme Decision, http:// www.nraila.org/ issues/articles/read.
aspx?id=265 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); Law Enforcement Groups, Brady Center Urge Supreme
Court To Reverse Distorted Reading Of Second Amendment, http://www.bradycampaign.orgl
media/release.php?release=958 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
2. The D.C. Circuit summarized these two predominant "camps" of Second Amendment
interpretation in Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379-80 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the case the
Supreme Court heard on appeal as District of Columbia v. Heller. For a useful collection of
scholarly work debating the collective right versus individual right positions, see Donald W. Dowd,
The Relevance of the Second Amendment to Gun Control Legislation, 58 MONT. L. REV. 79, 79-82
& nn.10-11 (1997).
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constitutional issue before the Court in Heller3-makes little practical
difference in states' and local governments' ability to regulate firearms. The
Second Amendment has never been incorporated against the states, and that
issue was not before the Court in Heller. Yet even if the Heller holding
were to apply to the states, gun policy would continue to be created by the
political decisions of state and local legislative bodies, relatively
unconstrained by acts of judicial constitutional interpretation.4
Indeed, as recent scholarship makes clear, those decisions ultimately
are not anchored in the Second Amendment at all, but rather derive from
intensely embraced cultural values and cultural myths. Proponents and
opponents of gun control essentially are arguing not so much about policy
as about the preservation-or, in some cases, the generation-of venerated
ways of life. In its most basic incarnation, this argument takes the form of a
clash between a strongly avowed reverence for the nation's individualist
frontier spirit and an equally strongly expressed desire for a communitarian
approach to American public life and policymaking.
5
While recent scholarship has taken a critical first step toward gun
policy reform by making clear that debates over gun control have always
been, at their heart, debates over competing cultural values, that scholarship
has stopped short of its most valuable conclusion. The competing cultural
values at stake in the gun debate have, at their core, an often unrecognized
racial conflict that extends back to the very founding of the nation. A look at
the story of the Second Amendment from the African American perspective
reveals not only the greater complexity of the cultural conflicts undergirding
the gun policy debate, but also lays bare the deep structure of gun policy
that has aided black repression from the slavery epoch to today. The cultural
mythology that undergirds the commitment to the right to bear arms has
long gained force from and been perpetuated by a perennial struggle
between white and black America. These myths pit white commitment to
gun ownership against a counter-narrative in the African American
community, which has simultaneously looked to guns as a defense against
white oppression, to gun control as a means of disenfranchisement and
dispossession, and to the contemporary prevalence of firearms as a threat to
its livelihood.
To date, most scholars have failed to analyze the way in which gun
policy has historically been deployed not to regulate gun ownership by
3. In granting certiorari, the Supreme 6ourt fashioned its own Question Presented, as
follows: "Whether the following provisions-D.C. Code secs. 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-
2507.02-violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any
state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their
homes?" District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 645 (Mem) (2007).
4. See infra Part V.
5. Id.
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white men-the primary locus of the gun rights movement-but rather to
disarm or generally disempower African Americans. In the culture wars
over gun policy, therefore, it is not enough to highlight racial tension; the
debate must also recognize the link between firearms and white control. By
doing so, true resolution of the divisive gun debate may be achieved.
Heller's most critical legacy thus will lie not in its interpretation of the
constitutional right to bear arms, but rather in its potential to generate a
renewed and reformed conversation about gun policy in light of these
powerful underlying cultural inputs. At its most productive, that
conversation will illuminate the powerful American mythology of gun
ownership, a mythology the origins and continuing vitality of which are
ineluctably bound up with racial conflict and with notions of true
citizenship. Tracing that mythology from its colonial roots through the
present will elucidate the motivations attached to the much-trumpeted
cultural value of defending home, hearth, and the free state in the American
context.
Part II of this Article examines what was at stake in Heller, both for the
District of Columbia and for the nation as a whole, arguing that the case will
have a limited impact at most on actual gun policy. While the "ideological,
visceral, polarized, ad hominem-and, often, ugly"6 rhetoric of the "great
American gun debates" 7 might suggest otherwise, actual decisions about
gun ownership and use will be made not by judicial fiat, but rather by
legislative action at the state and local level. Even though the Heller Court
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, state and local
governments will still have significant freedom to craft gun policy.
Part III explores the more crucial reason for Heller's ultimately limited
impact: The debate over the right to bear arms is not grounded in
constitutional interpretation, but in cultural values and cultural myth. This
Part demonstrates that political fights over gun control are more accurately
understood as fights over the ability to protect or construct revered ways of
life. As a result, any significant policy reform can only derive from an
understanding of and appeal to those ways of life.
Part IV delves into the specific cultural mythology that Richard Slotkin
has called the "Cult of the Colt,"8 with a detailed focus on the myth's
racialized underpinnings and effects, and on the elements of American
culture that enable its persistence. This Part develops my contention that the
debate over gun control is steeped in and propelled by a larger, four-
6. Bernard E. Harcourt, Introduction, GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 2
(Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
7. Id.
8. Richard Slotkin, Equalizers: The Cult of the Colt in American Culture, in GUNS, CRIME,
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 54, 55 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
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century-old tension between white and black America, a tension that must
be addressed-and ultimately eliminated-for meaningful reform to be
possible.
Finally, Part V responds to recent scholarly calls for refraining and
reforming the debate over gun policy. Solving the problem of gun violence
means crafting both policy and cultural attitudes that will make it possible
for those who embrace the values associated with gun ownership as well as
gun control to protect and revere their ways of life without any need or
motivation for quarrelling about armament. Systemic reform will require far
more than illusory compromises between advocates and opponents of gun
control, and it will be enacted on the ground by communities unwilling to
"stand by while [their] citizens die."9
II. D. C. . HELLER
In Parker v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that the Second
Amendment "protects an individual right to keep and bear arms." 1° The
court went on to hold that this individual right is violated by both the
District's ban on handguns and its regulation of the manner in which
lawfully held firearms may be kept.11 Because the latter regulation
"allow[ed] only for the use of a firearm during recreational activities," the
court reasoned, it "amount[ed] to a complete prohibition on the lawful use
of handguns for self-defense" and thus was per se unconstitutional.1 2 In so
holding, the D.C. Circuit became the first federal appeals court in the
nation's history to strike down a law because it offends the Second
Amendment. 1 3
Parker was most immediately remarkable for its break from the
seemingly settled Second Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
and the vast majority of the circuit courts of appeals. 4 Those courts have
9. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari at 30, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter Petition for cert.].
10. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
11. Id. at 399-401. The D.C. Code "generally prohibit[s] the registration, and thus the
possession, of any pistol-defined as a gun 'originally designed to be fired by use of a single
hand'-that was not registered in the District prior to the effective date of the law" in 1976. Petition
for cert., supra note 9, at 3 (citing D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.02). It also requires that
lawfully held (i.e., registered) firearms "be kept 'unloaded and disassembled or bound by trigger
lock or similar device, unless such firearm is kept at [a] place of business, or while being used for
lawful recreational purposes within the District of Columbia." Parker, 478 F.3d at 400-01 (quoting
D.C. Code § 7-2507.02).
12. Parker, 478 F.3d at 401.
13. Cass R. Sunstein, Staring Down the Barrel, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2007, at 9E.
14. As the District observed in its Petition for Certiorari, every federal circuit court of appeals
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almost uniformly held that the Constitution contains no individual right to
bear arms, but rather a right that is protected only in furtherance of the
militia's objectives.' 5 And it was precisely the potential for the Supreme
Court to resolve what Respondents referred to, somewhat expansively, as a
"profound split of authority among the federal appellate courts on the
question of whether the Second Amendment secures individual rights"'
' 6
that has generated claims of the Heller' s momentousness.' 
7
This section explores Heller's significance for gun policy in the United
States. To provide context for the "profound split of authority" created by
the D.C. Circuit's constitutional interpretation, the section begins with brief
summaries of competing visions of the right to bear arms in recent decades
and of Supreme Court and circuit court holdings on the Second
Amendment. It then turns to a discussion of Heller's finding that there is an
individual right to bear arms and that D.C.'s handgun ban and firearm
regulations exceed the city's authority to regulate for the health and welfare
of its citizens. The section concludes by arguing that, in terms of the
nationwide debate over policy, the case will have practical effect not
because of its holding, but because the Supreme Court's examination of the
issue has the potential to generate a renewed and reformed conversation
about guns.
A. Competing Visions of the Right to Bear Arms
Battles over the meaning of the constitutional "right to bear arms" often
have focused exclusively on the Second Amendment's sentence structure
and punctuation, 18 which, like that of many other constitutional provisions,
except for one has now considered the question, and Parker is the only decision that has invalidated
a gun control law. Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 8.
15. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
16. Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari at 7, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290).
17. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, First Monday, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTM3ZmRmZmM2ZWQ5NzFIZTE3YWEyMTk2NzAyOGR
jYTg- (predicting that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari because "Parker was the first case
in which a federal appellate court struck down a gun control law on Second Amendment grounds,
and only the second in which a federal appellate court accepted that the Second Amendment
protects an 'individual right' to own guns"); see also infra Part lI.D. (arguing that Heller's Second
Amendment holding will have far less of a practical effect on gun policy than will the case's
potential for stimulating a renewed and reformed conversation about that policy).
18. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST., amend. 1I. A great bulk of the
majority's opinion in Heller was an unyielding discussion of the Amendment's grammar and
structure. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2788-2805 (2008) (discussing in detail the
"operative" and "prefatory" clauses of the Amendment). The Parker court also began its analysis of
the amendment by adopting the posture of the grammarian: "The provision's second comma divides
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are not "marvel[s] of clarity."19 Because of the framers' punctuational
license, there has been uncertainty as to whether the first clause regarding
the militia directly relates to and defines the second clause regarding the
"right of the people to bear arms." 20 As a result of this ambiguity, three
distinct visions of the right to bear arms have emerged: the collective right
in furtherance of the militia, the individual right, and the republican theory
of the militia's role in maintaining the well-being of the state.
The collective right theory understands the Second Amendment to
protect state militias exclusively. The then-president of the American Bar
Association elaborated upon this theory in 1990, explaining that according
to case law, "the Second Amendment relates merely, solely, totally and only
to the unhampered regulation of a state militia. It does not confer an
individual right."'21 By contrast, the individual rights theory understands the
Amendment to protect the individual right to keep arms for the purposes of
self-defense, hunting, and other "legitimate" purposes. 22 Thomas Moncure,
Jr., the former Assistant General Counsel of the National Rifle Association
of America (NRA), adopted this theory in describing the Second
Amendment as wholly concerned with preserving the liberty of individual
Americans.
23
Finally, the republican militia theory understands the Second
Amendment as providing the classic check on the national government-an
the Amendment into two clauses; the first is prefatory, and the second operative." Parker v. District
of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Yet as authentic grammarians are aware, attempts
to derive meaning from the framers' casual approach to commas is an exercise in futility. As one
commentator has written:
The most popular grammars in the framers' day were written by Robert Lowth (1762)
and Lindley Murray (1795). Though both are concerned with correcting writing
mistakes neither dwells much on punctuation. Lowth calls punctuation "imperfect,"
with few precise rules and many exceptions. Murray adds that commas signal a pause
for breath. Here's an example of such a pause, from the Constitution: "The judicial
power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court" (Article Ill, Section
1). But times change. If a student put that comma in a paper today, it would be marked
wrong.
Dennis Baron, No Gun, Comma, Control, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A23.
19. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-44
(1989).
20. See Dowd, supra note 2.
21. L. Stanley Chauvin, President, ABA, ABA Journal, May 1990, quoted in HENIGAN ET AL.,
infra note 42; see also Dowd, supra note 2, at 83-94.
22. See Dowd, supra note 2, at 95-105.
23. Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 HoW. L.J. 589,
589 (1991). Moncure finds that, historically, certain groups-"Mullatoes," "Negroes," and
"Indians"--were denied the right to bear arms precisely because they were not citizens of the
United States, and true citizenship includes this right. Id.
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armed citizenry organized into militias for the common good.24 Consistent
with this theory, the "[u]ltimate 'checking value' in a republican polity is
the ability of an armed populace, presumptively motivated by a shared
commitment to the common good, to resist governmental tyranny." 25 It
bears emphasizing, however, that at the time the Second Amendment was
drafted, the very notion of a "republican polity" was vexed. "To be sure,"
gun-rights advocate Steven Halbrook has explained, "colonial authorities
sought to disarm blacks and Indians . "..."26 Citizenship itself was
complicated by the existence of the racial hierarchy, and republicanism in
America necessarily manifested itself as a reflection of this hierarchy.
Within the prevailing racial order, in other words, any republican right to
take up arms against tyranny was far from universal.27
B. The Second Amendment in the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of
Appeal
Until Heller, the Supreme Court had said relatively little about the right
to bear arms. In its notorious Dred Scott decision, 28 the Court suggested in
dictum that the Second Amendment protected an individual right.
Considering whether African Americans were citizens, Chief Justice Taney
focused on the putatively frightening implications of granting blacks the
privileges and immunities of citizenship:
It would give to persons of the Negro race, who were recognised
as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter every
other State whenever they pleased..., and it would give them the
full liberty of speech in public and private upon all subjects upon
which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.29
While Taney's reflection seems to imply that the right to bear arms is
comparable to the freedoms of movement, speech, and association, it
derived not from an interpretation of the Constitution itself, but rather from
an apparently fearful analysis of the social consequences of black access to
arms.
24. For a general description of this theory, which "blend[s]" the collective right and
individual right theories, see Levinson, supra note 19, at 648-51.
25. Id. at 648.
26. Stephen P. Halbrook, Deconstructing the Second Amendment, INDEP. INST., Nov. 3, 2005,
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=342.
27. See infra notes 161-213 and accompanying text.
28. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
29. Id. at417.
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The Court turned to actual constitutional explication of the Amendment
in the 1875 case United States v. Cruikshank,30 holding that the Constitution
does not create a right to keep and bear arms. 31 While such a right may exist
independent of the Constitution, according to Cruikshank, the Second
Amendment's protection of that right extends only "as against
Congressional interference." 32 The Court expanded on the latter idea a
decade later, holding in Presser v. Illinois that "the amendment is a
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government,
and not upon that of the state[s]. ' 33
The Court's most influential and oft-cited decision on the right to bear
arms, United States v. Miller,34 held that the National Firearms Act and its
registration requirement did not violate the Second Amendment.3 5 In an
opinion written by the conservative Justice James McReynolds,36 the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of restrictions on gun ownership solely by
considering the relationship of the firearm at issue to the potential activity of
the organized Militia. Constitutional protection of the right to bear arms,
Miller suggested, is limited to arms having "some reasonable relationship to
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."37 The unanimous
Court reasoned that "[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces the declaration and
guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and
applied with that end in view.
38
Finally, in a 1980 case, Lewis v. United States,39 the Court used the
rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the 1968 Gun Control
Act. Examining the Act under an Equal Protection challenge, the Court did
not apply strict scrutiny, the test it applies when considering limitations on
fundamental constitutional rights.40 Indeed, as Justice Blackmun explained,
30. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
31. Id. at 553.
32. Id. at 552.
33. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886) (citing Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553).
34. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
35. Id. at 178.
36. See H. Ober Hess, Second Amendment-The Right to Bear Arms, 71 PA. B. ASS'N. Q. 82,
82 (2000).
37. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
38. Id.
39. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980).
40. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (strict
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review when a fundamental right is implicated in a Due
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rational basis analysis was appropriate because the Act's "legislative
restrictions on the use of firearms... do not trench upon any
constitutionally protected liberties.' Under Lewis, in short, the right to
bear arms is not a fundamental right. 42 Among the circuit courts of appeals,
only the Second Circuit has not directly construed the Second Amendment;
it has, however, held that the Amendment does not create a fundamental
right.43 The Tenth Circuit held in 2004 that the right to bear arms is limited
to an individual's "direct affiliation with a well-organized state-supported
militia," 44 and cases in the First, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
reached similar conclusions.45 In a somewhat different vein, the Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the Second
Amendment's protections may be invoked only by the states themselves,
not by individuals (who lack standing because the constitutional right is
collective).46 Until the D.C. Circuit decided Parker, the outlier among the
circuits was the Fifth, which had suggested in dictum that the Second
Amendment does protect an individual right apart from any connection
between the arms at issue and service in a militia.
47
Prior to Heller, then, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
seemed to have settled two core propositions about Second Amendment
jurisprudence with only minor disagreement. First, the Amendment protects
a collective and not an individual right. Second, the Amendment applies to
the federal government but has not been incorporated by the Fifth
Process challenge); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1987) (citations omitted) (strict scrutiny as
the appropriate standard of review in Equal Protection challenges to classifications based on race or
national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights).
41. Lewis, 44 U.S. at 65 n.8 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; United States v. Three Winchester
30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1290, n.5 (7th Cir. 1974)); United States v.
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972)).
42. See DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA 7-8 (1995).
43. Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 8 n.3 (citing United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128
(2d Cir. 1984)).
44. United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2004), quoted in Petition for cert.,
supra note 9, at 8.
45. Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 8-9 n.4 (citing Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916,
923 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir.
1997)).
46. Id. at 8-9 & n.5 (citing United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam)); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillespie v. City of
Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 710 (7th Cir. 1999); Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1087 (9th Cir.
2002)).
47. Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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Amendment to apply to state and local governments.
Predictably,4 8 the Heller majority departed from earlier precedent and
found, unequivocally, an individual right to bear arms for "traditionally
lawful" purposes, such as self-defense within the home.49 Most notably, the
Court found that this individual right was unconnected to militia service and
extended not only to self-defense but also to such lawful purposes as
hunting. 50 The Court's reasoning focused disproportionately on the structure
of the Amendment, finding that the Amendment is "naturally" divided into
two parts-a prefatory clause and an operative clause. 51 Importantly for the
Court, the prefatory clause regarding the militia does not limit or expand the
operative clause, regarding the right to keep and bear arms, but simply
"announces a purpose." 52 After an historical review of the militia in
America-to identify "a purpose" the prefatory clause is meant to
announce-and an examination of the use of key phrases in the operative
clause of the Amendment over the past two centuries, the Court had "no
doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment
confer[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms. 53
The Heller court did concede that there are limitations to this right,54 all
of which are already codified in federal, state, and local laws. However, the
Court offered no indication of the full scope of these limitations. It was clear
to the Court that the District had overstepped the ill-defined boundaries.
55
C. Heller and Gun Policy in the District of Columbia
For a number of reasons that the next subsection explores,56 Heller's
resolution of the circuit split will have little practical effect, nationwide, on
the gun policy debate. 57 It could have dramatic effect, however, in the
48. Sunstein, supra note 13.
49. The Court does not view its decision of Heller as an overturning of precedent. Instead, it
works hard to demonstrate that none of the Court's precedents foreclose the current interpretation.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2830-36 (2008).
50. Id. at 2801.
51. Id. at 2789.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2799.
54. Seeid. at 2816-17.
55. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2817-22 (2008).
56. See infra notes 244-63 and accompanying text.
57. Of course, there will be an immediate and consequential impact of the Heller decision. As
a result of the Court's ambiguous discussion of limitations to the Second Amendment, Heller, 128
S.Ct. at 2816-17, the lower courts will now be flooded with challenges to state and local gun
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District itself, where the Court's decision has restricted the city's level of
autonomy in regulating for the health and welfare of its citizens. In its
petition for certiorari, the District explicitly linked the gun policies at issue
in the case to its autonomy as a government: The city adopted those policies
"soon after being granted home rule authority.""8 The 1976 City Council
made findings regarding handgun use in accidents causing the death of
children, violence against women, criminal activity in general, and murders
of law enforcement officers, and concluded that because "handguns present
a singular danger, the solution was to stop the introduction of more
handguns into the District.- 59 Exercising its new power of self-government,
the Council declared that adopting a handgun ban in the city code "'reflects
a legislative decision' that handguns 'have no legitimate use in the purely
urban environment of the District of Columbia.' "60
While Heller was most closely watched nationwide for what it would
say about an individual as opposed to collective right to bear arms in the
Second Amendment,6 1 its most crucial holding for the District was whether
the city's handgun ban and other firearm regulations are unreasonable
restrictions on any constitutionally protected right.62 The Parker court
reasoned that the handgun ban and the requirement for disabling other
firearms within the home amounted to "a complete prohibition on the lawful
use of handguns for self-defense," and thus were per se unconstitutional.63
The District asked the Supreme Court, then, to state that because the Bill of
Rights does not create or protect rights that are absolute, courts should defer
to sound legislative judgment in regulating those rights that are protected.64
Even if the Court recognized an individual right, the District hoped to have
restrictions. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Coming Next, Court Skirmishes in Cities, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2008, at Al ("The individual right to bear arms identified by the Supreme Court on Thursday will
have little practical impact in most of the country, legal experts said, though Washington's
comprehensive ban on handguns used for self-defense in the home will have to be revised, and
similar laws in several cities are also vulnerable.").
58. Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 3.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. at 5.
61. Professor Sunstein's prediction was on target in this regard: "Dominated as it is by
Republican appointees, the court will adopt the individual-rights interpretation. It will accept a
controversial reading of the amendment's original meaning. It will run roughshod over long-settled
understandings among the federal courts." Sunstein, supra note 13.
62. In this regard, Sunstein went on to predict that "the court will recognize that reasonable
restrictions are permissible-and thus will energize, rather than end, the national discussion about
the regulation of guns." Id.
63. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
64. Brief for the Petitioner at 44-48, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)
(No. 07-290).
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the power to trump that right by identifying compelling state interests.65
Practically speaking, the city sought affirmation of its autonomy to legislate
for the health and welfare of its residents, based on its understanding that
"[w]hatever right the Second Amendment guarantees, it does not require the
District to stand by while its citizens die." 66 The District, however, did not
prevail on the question of the handgun ban's constitutionality.
The issue of local autonomy in Heller was of especially critical
significance to the African American community. According to Census
2000, D.C. is among the ten blackest cities in the nation, with roughly sixty
percent of its population self-describing as "Black or African American
alone," or "Black or African American alone or in combination." 67 And gun
violence affects black America with disproportionate force. The Children's
Defense Fund has calculated that nationwide, "[t]he number of African
American children and teenagers killed by gunfire since 1979 is more than
ten times the number of African American citizens of all ages lynched
throughout American history."68 While only thirteen percent of the U.S.
population is black, "twenty-five percent of all firearm deaths and fifty-
three percent of all firearm homicides during the years 1999 to 2004" had
black victims.69 Such disparities are exacerbated in the District itself, where,
in 2004, 135 of 137 victims of firearm homicide were black. y
In considering a city routinely described as the nation's "murder
capital, 7 y it seems courts would do well to respect rational legislative
judgments as to how to stem the loss of lives-nearly always the loss of
black lives-to gun violence. 72 And such judgments are no less rational or
65. Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 30.
66. Id.
67. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000, at 7 (2001), available at
www.census.gov /prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO I-5.pdf.
68. CHILDREN'S DEF. FUND, PROTECT CHILDREN, NOT GUNS 2 (2007), available at
www.childrensdefense.org/gunreport, cited in Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense &
Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 25-26, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) [hereinafter NAACP amicus brief].
69. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, WISQARS INJURY MORTALITY REPORTS (1999-2004),
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate0 0sy.html, cited in NAACP amicus brief, supra note
68, at 26.
70. Id., cited in NAACP amicus brief, supra note 68, at 27.
71. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices to Rule on D.C. Gun Ban; 2nd Amendment Case Could
Affect Laws Nationwide, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2007, at AOl (quoting Robert A. Levy, "a scholar at
the libertarian Cato Institute who has spent years planning a challenge that would reach the Supreme
Court," to the effect that the Court's grant of certiorari is "'especially good news for residents of
Washington, D.C., which has been the murder capital of the nation despite an outright ban on all
functional firearms since 1976').
72. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, makes a very brief attempt to address the specific
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worthy of deference simply because neighboring jurisdictions have made
different judgments permitting a regional flow of guns.73
D. Heller and Gun Policy in the Nation as a Whole
Despite the potential impact that Heller will have in D.C., there are
three reasons that the case is likely to have an extremely limited effect on
gun policy nationwide. First, the Second Amendment has never been
incorporated against the states.74 Second, even though the Court held that
the Constitution protects an individual right to bear arms, rights protected by
concerns of gun-violence riddled communities before dismissing these concerns, their relationship
to this judicial exercise, and the choices made by the D.C. legislature outright. He writes:
We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take
seriously the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition of
handgun ownership is a solution. The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a
variety of tools for combating that problem... But the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home. Undoubtedly
some think that the 2nd Am is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the
pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and
where gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is not
debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment
extinct.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
73. See Petition for cert., supra note 9, at 28 n.16 (When he approved the legislation adopting
the handgun ban and firearms regulation, "Mayor Washington recognized, 'no system of firearms
control can be fully effective without appropriate controls at the regional and national level.' [B]ut
just as 'reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which
seems most acute to the legislative mind,' Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955), a local legislature cannot be faulted for addressing only that part of a nationwide
problem over which it has power."); NAACP amicus brief, supra note 68, at 28. But see Brief of
Respondent at 29, 31, Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2738 (No. 07-290) (asserting that because the District
acknowledges the continued presence of guns in the city, and "[b]ecause of [the District's]
demonstrated-even if understandable-inability to police the entire city, local government cannot
substitute for the right of individuals to keep functional firearms in their homes").
74. See discussion supra, Part II. The question of incorporation was not presented by this
case, but the Court, citing precedent, acknowledged that the Second Amendment applies only to the
Federal Government. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2813 n.23. In Presser v. Illinois, cited by the Court in
Heller, id., the Court held that the Second Amendment limits the power only of the federal
government, and does not limit the power of the states. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1886). That the Court granted certiorari on a Second Amendment case coming from the District of
Columbia, rather than from a state, means that Heller is not the right vehicle through which to
consider whether Presser should be overturned and the amendment incorporated against the states.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Will Decide if Handgun Kept at Home Is Individual Right, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, at Al. One scholar has argued, however, that a Supreme Court holding that
the Second Amendment protects an individual right likely would include or lead to a holding that
the amendment applies to the states. Dowd, supra note 2, at 106. Furthermore, Maryland and three
other states have filed an amicus brief on behalf of D.C., arguing that "allowing the appeals court
ruling [in Parker] to stand would destabilize current law and 'cast a cloud over all federal and state
law restricting access to firearms."' Barnes, supra note 7 1.
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the Bill of Rights are not unassailable. Indeed, states may restrict
fundamental rights to varying degrees.75 And with regard to the Second
Amendment, according to Professor Tushnet, "substantial amounts of gun
control are constitutionally permissible even if we accept the best versions
of the arguments favored by gun-rights proponents." 76 In short, as the
subtitle of Tushnet's book-"Why the Constitution Can't End the Battle
Over Guns"-suggests, gun regulation or its absence will continue to be a
matter almost entirely of state and local policy, even after Heller's moment
of constitutional interpretation. Thus, gun policy will remain an issue
decided by legislative action, and not exclusively by courts.
Finally, and most crucially for policy reform, recent scholarship has
demonstrated that political fights over gun control ultimately are not about
constitutional interpretation at all; instead, they derive from and perpetuate
intensely held cultural values and cultural myths for which Second
Amendment rhetoric has become a sort of mask. The Court's determination
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, in other words,
will not be an insurmountable bar for state and local governments that will
continue to formulate policy in the shadow of those values and myths.
Heller's most lasting legacy, therefore, is likely to be the opportunity it
provides, through the attention that it draws, for understanding and
responding to those policy debates in new ways.
III. MUCH ADO ABOUT... SOMETHING ELSE
Over the last decade, Professor Dan Kahan and others have
demonstrated persuasively that the "Great American Gun Debate" has raged
for almost half a century without satisfying results because the rhetoric on
both sides has obscured what that debate is truly about. 77 According to
Kahan,
Whatever they say in public, those involved in the gun control
75. Professor Heyman explains that "modem constitutional law distinguishes between
fundamental rights, which can be restricted only for compelling reasons, and nonfundamental rights,
which are subject to reasonable regulation to promote the common welfare." Steven J. Heyman,
Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1317 n.227 (1998). Recall that in Lewis v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that "legislative restrictions on the use of firearms . . . do not trench upon any
constitutionally protected liberties," and applied the rational basis test-rather than the strict
scrutiny test applied to fundamental rights-to an Equal Protection Challenge to the Gun Control
Act. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 & n.8 (1980).
76. MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN'T END THE BATTLE
OVER GUNS, at xvi (2007).
77. Dan M. Kahan, The Tyranny of Econometrics and the Circumspection of Liberalism: Two
Problems with the Gun Debate, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 44 (Bernard E.
Harcourt ed., 2003) [hereinafter Kahan, Tyranny].
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debate are not really motivated by beliefs about guns and
crime.... What does motivate them, a wealth of sociological and
historical literature suggests, is their attachment to competing
cultural styles that assign social meanings to guns.
7 8
In short, conflicts over gun policy-and over the meaning of the Second
Amendment-mask a deeper conflict over intensely held cultural values,
and resolution of the "Great American Gun Debate" depends on unmasking
that conflict over values.
This section begins by summarizing recent scholarship unmasking the
true nature of the debate over gun policy. It then turns to what this
scholarship suggests are the implications of that analysis, and how
policymakers and scholars might better resolve the national conflict over
guns. The section concludes by proposing that while Kahan is generally
right in arguing that the gun debate masks a deeper battle over cultural
values, and in suggesting that successful reform to gun policy depends on
unmasking and addressing the sources of those values, any fruitful response
to that argument must account for the racialized underpinnings of Second
Amendment rhetoric.
A. The True Nature of the Gun Debate
Professor Kahan situates his theory of the "Great American Gun
Debate" in a larger argument about theories of deterrence. 79 Deterrence
theory, Kahan posited, adopts a "disembodied idiom of costs and benefits"
that ultimately "elides the points of moral contention that motivate public
positions on these disputed issues."80 As a result, the true ideological
impulses behind the gun control debate are not explored, and to the extent
that these ideologies are deleterious, they will not be addressed and
dismantled. Instead, deterrence arguments have the opposite effect: "Not
talking about these meanings in a public way doesn't render them inert; if
anything, norms that discourage divisive public discourse extend the life of
these meanings by making it harder for their critics to expose them and
78. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 452 (1999)
[hereinafter Kahan, Deterrence].
79. Id. Kahan uses the term "deterrence" to "refer broadly to the consequentialist theory ..
that depicts punishment as a policy aimed at creating efficient behavioral incentives." Id. at 415. In
terms of gun policy, according to Kahan, this theory translates into the competing ideas that
"banning firearms, particularly handguns, will discourage violent criminals from arming themselves
and preying on innocent victims" (the pro-gun-control position) and that "permitting potential
victims to arm themselves will deter violent criminals from preying on them" (the anti-gun-control
position). Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 417.
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easier for their beneficiaries to disclaim their significance in the law." 8'
Furthermore, Kahan's research demonstrates, the putatively objective
statistics quoted by advocates on both sides of the debate bear little relation
to those advocates' actual reasons for supporting or opposing gun control:
"social meanings [of guns and gun control] that go to the heart of their
fundamental moral commitments and cultural identities."
82
These moral commitments and cultural identities, according to Kahan,
fall generally, but not exclusively, into two camps:
[O]ne side is disproportionately rural, southern or western, and
Protestant, as well as male and white; the other is
disproportionately urban, eastern, Catholic or Jewish, as well as
female and black. The two sides also subscribe to competing
cultural ethics .... For the former, the "model is that of the
independent frontiersman who takes care of himself and his family
with no interference from the state." To them, "the ... gun
symbolizes much that is right in [American] culture," including
"manliness, self-sufficiency, and independence." [For] [t]he
latter[,] "the gun is symbolic of much that is wrong in American
culture," including "violence, aggression,. . . male dominance,"
individualism, and racism.
83
In arguing about gun control, Kahan posits, these two camps are less
interested in crime control than they are in capturing "the expressive capital
of the law," and thus enshrining their deeply held cultural values and
identity in the law.84 Indeed, Kahan goes so far as to declare that, in terms of
this competition over values, gun control is to its advocates "what flag-
desecration laws are to the party of patriotism." 85 He concludes that for gun
control advocates to succeed in altering policy, they must essentially find
some sort of ideological middle ground with their opponents, "assur[ing]
gun owners that control is not motivated by disgust for their cultural
identities." 8
6
81. Id. at418.
82. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 451.
83. Id. at 453 (citations omitted). For a fuller discussion of the Cult of the Colt, see infra notes
102-20 and accompanying text.
84. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 462.
85. Id. at 460. See also infra notes 244-59 and accompanying text.
86. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 462.
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B. The Policy Implications of the True Nature of the Gun Debate
Kahan and Donald Braman later expanded on Kahan's theory of the
cultural power of guns and the cultural underpinnings of the debate over gun
policy, explaining that "[i]f individuals adopt one position or another
because of what guns mean rather than what guns do, then empirical data
are unlikely to have much effect on the gun debate." 87 In terms of affecting
policy, then,
Instead of continuing to focus on the consequences of various
types of regulation, academics and others who want to help resolve
the gun controversy should dedicate themselves to identifying with
as much precision as possible the cultural visions that animate this
dispute, and to formulating appropriate strategies for enabling
those visions to be expressively reconciled in law.
88
Kahan and Braman thus make a powerful proposal: The very structure and
vocabulary of the gun policy debate must be changed, so that the "moderate
middle" in the debate is enabled to consider the competing cultural values at
stake in "meaningful yet respectful terms."89 These "moderate citizens"
ultimately will accomplish reform, in Kahan's and Braman's appealing
vision, by "seek[ing] policies that accommodate their respective
worldviews." 9
0
Most recently, Professor Kahan has drawn on theories of risk
perception to argue that what has been described as the "white-male
effect"-the statistical tendency of "this seemingly fearless group of [white]
men" to worry less about "myriad dangers" (including guns) than do women
87. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statitics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1291, 1294 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan & Braman, More
Statistics].
88. Id. Kahan's and Braman's admonition that scholars and policymakers should move
beyond the consequences of potential regulation and focus their attention instead on the cultural
underpinnings of the gun debate is, in some sense, an analogue of Professor Zimring's concept of
the "free-lunch syndrome" in that debate. Id.; see also Franklin E. Zimring, Continuity and Change
in the American Gun Debate, in GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 29, 33 (Bernard E.
Harcourt ed., 2003). Zimring argues that pro-gun-control forces have tended-to their detriment-
"to pick on small and fairly uncontroversial control proposals but to invest these programs with the
suggestion that their passage will have a substantial impact on rates of lethal violence." Id. at 33.
Control advocates engage in "free-lunch" politics when they "couple small operational changes with
the full weight of firearms control symbolism," thus eliminating "realistic analysis of the impacts of
specific control strategies from public discussion." Id. It is simply not reasonable, Zimring argues,
to expect real policy benefits from such "small investments." Id.
89. Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun
Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing a Better Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569,
571 (2006) [hereinafter Braman & Kahan, Overcoming the Fear].
90. Kahan & Braman, More Statistics, supra note 87, at 1322.
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and minorities-derives from the typical cultural worldview of such men. 91
Perceptions of risk from guns or other dangers, according to Kahan's study,
vary across populations precisely because those perceptions are the product
of "motivated cognition, through which people seek to deflect threats to
identities they hold, and roles they occupy, by virtue of contested cultural
norms." 92 In terms of gun policy, Kahan and his colleagues posit, their
findings suggest that gun-control advocates hoping to communicate the
risks posed by firearms must find a way of conveying this information to
their opponents in "an identity-protective fashion."93 Kahan's goal is to
change the terms of the gun debate by acknowledging that its true focus is
competing cultural values and then to find some means of accommodating
those competing values in policy proposals that respect, rather than
denigrate, them.
When Kahan and Braman suggest policies that might instantiate such a
re-formed vision of the gun debate, their three "compromise" proposals
seemingly fall into the trap of "free-lunch" politics warned of by Professor
Zimring. 94 Their first compromise stipulates that gun control advocates will
avow that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, while
opponents will agree to handgun registration. 95 Their second compromise
would entice handgun owners to register their weapons through "a tax
rebate or some other monetary award., 96 Finally, their third compromise
would make it possible for citizens to use the same "civic registration form"
91. Dan M. Kahan, et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL L. STD. 465, 466 (2007). In designing their study
and analyzing their results, Kahan and his colleagues drew heavily on the work of Mary Douglas,
who created a "'group-grid" typology, which classifies competing sets of norms, or 'worldviews,'
along two cross-cutting dimensions." Id. at 468. Within this typology, people are classified on a
"group" spectrum from "individualist" to "communitarian," and on a "grid" spectrum from
"hierarchist" to "egalitarian." Id. "Those with a low group or individualistic orientation expect
individuals to 'fend for themselves and therefore tend to be competitive'; those with a high group or
communitarian worldview assume that individuals will 'depend on one another . . .' Persons who
have a high grid or hierarchical orientation expect resources, opportunities, respect, and the like to
be 'distributed on the basis of explicit public social classifications, such as sex, color, . . . holding a
bureaucratic office, [or] . . . lineage. Low grid orientations value 'an egalitarian state of affairs in
which no one is prevented from participating in any social role because he or she is the wrong sex,
or is too old, or does not have the right family connections . I... Id. at 468-69 (citations omitted).
Kahan and his colleagues concluded that "[t]he insensitivity to risk reflected in the white-male
effect can . . . be seen as a defense response to a form of cultural identity threat that afflicts
hierarchical and individualistic white males." Id. at 467.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 497.
94. Zimring, supra note 88, at 33.
95. Braman & Kahan, Overcoming the Fear, supra note 89, at 599.
96. Id. at 599-600.
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to register "as a voter, as a juror, or as a keeper or bearer of a firearm." 97 It
is simply not clear how these minor policy adjustments would address the
deep cultural meanings of the gun debate that Kahan and his colleagues
have so incisively identified.
C. Deepening the Inquiry: Cultural Values and Cultural Mythology
To acknowledge that the debate over gun policy has always, at its
heart, been about something beyond the confines of the Second Amendment
is to take an enormous first step in reforming that policy. Kahan and his
colleagues, however, have stopped short of exploring the destination to
which this crucial first step might lead. Such an exploration requires leaving
aside compromise "free-lunch" solutions, which are "identity-protective"
98
in only the most cosmetic sense. While the appearance of political
conciliation over registration issues, for instance, may at first blush seem
like a victory for Kahan's "moderate middle," that conciliation essentially
masks the underlying cultural conflict. Conciliation allows both sides of the
debate to evade more difficult issues by declaring victory for their
worldview.
Truly transforming the debate over gun policy into a thoughtful
discussion of the underlying cultural conflict means unmasking and
confronting precisely those difficult issues, including the explicit and
persistent racial component of the nation's Cult of the Colt. A key aspect of
Second Amendment mythology has been the notion that the right to bear
arms is (i) universally available to all Americans, (ii) essential for freedom,
and (iii) vital to one's self-defense. 99 The gun owner thus is venerated as the
mythical guardian of the free state and the defender of home and hearth.
97. Id. at 600.
98. Kahan et al., supra note 91, at 497.
99. While the Heller majority would not describe this as mythology, it acknowledges the
widespread belief in the individual rights meaning of the Second Amendment, despite consistent
and unwavering Supreme Court interpretation finding otherwise to date. Justice Scalia argues that
the "erroneous reliance upon an uncontested and virtually unreasoned case [Miller] cannot nullify
the reliance of millions of Americans... upon the true meaning of the right to keep and bear arms."
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2815 n.24 (2008). For Scalia, America's reliance on
this "myth" is sufficient to support the majority's new interpretation of the Amendment. See id. at
2845 n.38 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens counters:
The majority appears to suggest that even if the meaning of the Second Amendment
has been considered settled by courts and legislatures for over two centuries, that
settled meaning is overcome by the 'reliance of millions of Americans' 'upon the true
meaning of the right to keep and bear arms.' . . . [lit is hard to see how Americans
have 'relied,' in the usual sense of the word, on the existence of a constitutional right
that, until 2001, had been rejected by every federal court to take up the question.
Id. (citation omitted).
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However, a consideration of the relationship between gun ownership and
black America reveals that that veneration has been built and sustained upon
a racially charged foundation. An efficacious response to Professor Kahan's
call for a re-formed debate over gun policy must not only expose that
foundation but also address its implications for an "identity-protective"
discourse.
The next two sections lay the groundwork for such a response, first
examining the racialized history and mythology of gun ownership in the
United States, then suggesting that true policy reform can be crafted only in
the light of that history and mythology. If the Cult of the Colt's motivation
to protect home and hearth-and, concomitantly, to protect cultural
identity---derives in large part from irrational race-based hatred or race-
based fear, then the most ambitious and most successful policy reform will
seek to eliminate that hatred or fear. In short, if such a motivation were
unmasked and dismantled, gun proponents could protect their deeper
cultural identity without firing a single shot.
IV. THE RACIALIZED MYTHOLOGY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
In explaining why the District's ban on handguns is impermissible, the
Heller majority observed that the handgun is the preferred weapon for self-
defense. 100 The Court thus embraced the cultural mythology underlying the
Cult of the Colt:101 the notion that the gun owner is both the guardian of the
free state and the defender of home and hearth. This section adds a missing
piece to the gun debate puzzle by explaining the racialized nature of the
cultural values and cultural identities at stake in the rhetoric of Second
Amendment protection for gun ownership. In so doing, this section
interrogates a variation on the "white-male effect" that Kahan identifies but
does not seek to dismantle.'0 2 For with respect to the virtues and risks of
self-arming, African Americans have never had the mastery of the debate
and have rarely had the advantage of Second Amendment interpretation.
Instead, the public health crisis engendered by guns in African American
communities has persisted and worsened while "private financial and
political fortunes"' 3 have been made within the gun industry and gun
100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008) ("[H]andguns are the most
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of
their use is invalid.").
101. See Slotkin, supra note 8.
102. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
103. "The success of the gun industry and the NRA in blocking efforts to enact stricter gun
control laws is a shocking story of the triumph of private financial and political fortunes over public
health needs." Ira Helfand, M.D., Foreword to DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE
CONSTITUTION, THE MYTH OF SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA, at
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lobby.
The section begins by examining the cultural values-which ultimately
have coalesced into a mythological identity-of the American gun owner,
exploring the relationship between those values and the rhetoric surrounding
the Second Amendment. The section then turns to a discussion of the
racialized underpinnings of the mythology of American gun ownership,
from its origins in the Constitution to its incarnation in both the
disarmament and the armament of African Americans. This discussion
suggests that the cultural mythology surrounding the right to bear arms both
gains force from and perpetuates itself through a perennial struggle between
white and black America. The section concludes that the myth and its varied
cultural incarnations have had an immense social cost, a cost felt most
severely by black America.
A. The Political Use of the Second Amendment
1. The White American Mythology of Gun Ownership
In describing the Cult of the Colt, Richard Slotkin has argued that
despite the "fundamental principle of American politics that a democracy is
a government of laws and not of men," Americans have clung stubbornly to
a belief that "might be called the 'Cowboy Corollary' to the Declaration of
Independence: 'God may have made men, but Samuel Colt made them
equal. ' ' 4 Indeed, Colt's invention of the repeating revolver has been
linked, by historians such as Daniel Boorstin, to a "democratization" of
American justice.105 Yet as Slotkin points out, this mythology of Colt-
generated equality rests on a fundamental error: "The whole point in having
a weapon is to gain an edge," and "the peculiar advantage of owning a
repeating firearm like the Colt is not realized in a gunfight against an
equally armed opponent. Rather, it lies in the capacity of a technologically
advanced weapon to enable its user to defeat larger numbers of less well-
armed adversaries."' 6 In short, the gun permits its holder to transcend his
perceived position of inferiority and to gain superiority over, rather than
equality with, his adversaries. 0 7
xii (1995).
104. Slotkin, supra note 8, at 54.
105. Id. at 57-58.
106. Id. at 58-59.
107. Slotkin observes that the Colt revolver's "first great success" as an "equalizer" thus
derived from:
[I]ts use by Samuel Walker's Texas Rangers in mounted combat with Comanche
Indians in 1836. The Comanche bow had an effective range comparable to the
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It was precisely by means of this skewed sense of "equalizing,"
however, that the Colt became mythologized as "the gun that won the West"
through its performance in the Indian wars. 10 8 Indeed, today's gun culture
had its origins in a conflation of two American identities with similarly
vexed senses of equality: the militia heritage of the South and the frontier
heritage of the expanding West.10 9 When Samuel Colt himself began
spinning mythologized narratives of his inspiration for creating the
repeating revolver, he turned not to an image of the bold frontiersman
blazing new trails through the wilderness or to an image of "equalized"
gunfighters settling supposed duels of honor. 10 Instead, he painted a portrait
of the solitary white planter potentially overwhelmed by a slave revolt but
finding salvation in his gun.'11 The same gun that could win the West
through suppression of Indian tribes could, in Colt's vision, preserve the
South through suppression of slave revolts.' 12 In both cases, whites
temporarily finding themselves part of a threatened racial minority could
use the Colt to achieve superiority and control-an "equalization" process
with obviously baneful consequences for the white majority if it were made
available to Indians, slaves, or free blacks.
113
Not surprisingly, the privilege of gun ownership in Colonial America
attached to and was evidence of true citizenship, trumping the distinction of
suffrage.114 As Professor Kahan has explained,
One could draw inferences about another's social competence,
economic class, profession, and even desirability as a suitor from
whether he carried a "Kentucky rifle," an "English shotgun," or a
dueling pistol. To prevent the appropriation of status-and to repel
subversive threats to authority-norms and laws regulated who
Rangers' single-shot carbine, and a higher potential rate of fire. Moreover, since the
Rangers were attacking a tribal people operating within range of their home villages,
they were likely to be outnumbered by the Comanche in most engagements. In that
kind of combat, a repeating pistol was indeed an "equalizer."
Id. at 60.
108. Id. Slotkin quotes an 1859 author opining that it was the superiority of American
civilization that allowed the Colt to be invented, so that "the less cultivated races are conquered by
the more intelligent." Id. (citation omitted). This particular element of the mythology was not put to
rest until 1997, with the publication of Jared Diamond's comprehensive Guns, Germs, and Steel.
109. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 454.
110. Regarding the Colt's putative democratization of "the right to fight" over issues of honor,
see Slotkin, supra note 8, at 57-58.
111. See infra notes 168-88 and accompanying text.
112. Id.
113. See infra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
114. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 454 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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could possess such weapons. Thus, "[w]ell into the nineteenth
century the gun was a more widely held badge of membership in
the body politic than the ballot.""' 5
As a badge of citizenship in pre-twentieth century America, the privilege of
gun ownership-and of achieving superiority over a more powerful
opponent-thus belonged almost exclusively to white men.
Despite the growing obsolescence of the armed militia and the
diminishing Western frontier, "cultural momentum" has perpetuated the
mythic image of the armed patriot,' 16 "bearing his arms about him and
keeping them in his house, his castle, for his own defense."' 117 In American
popular culture, the gun owner was and is a self-sufficient man fighting for
hearth and home. 1 8 Today's gun owner, like his predecessor, tends to
embrace the image of the nineteenth-century "true man," the rural-
southern or western-white male." 9 By contrast, his cultural and
ideological counterpart, who tends to support gun control, generally is
urban, eastern, female, and black. 120 Yet the contemporary gun owner is
also an educated member of the middle class, one who arguably is as
troubled by senseless gun violence in urban America as most. 121 What, then, is
the impetus for protected gun ownership in the twenty-first century United
States?
2. The Argument for Self-Defense
The call to arms has been popularized in recent years by the argument
for self-protection and crime deterrence. 122 Ronald Reagan, a member of the
NRA, argued that law-abiding citizens had a right to bear arms in
furtherance of their safety and welfare; liberals, he explained, were
115. Id.
116. "Through 'cultural momentum,' remnants of these meanings have outlived the utilitarian
role that guns played in arming militias and settling the frontier." Id.
117. Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and "The Constitutional Right
to Bear Arms: " Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
341, 362 n.104 (1995) (quoting Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky in an 1866 congressional
session).
118. See Kahan, Tyranny, supra note 77.
119. See Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 452-53.
120. See id.
121. Daniel D. Polsby & Don B. Kates, Jr., Of Holocausts and Gun Control, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
1237, 1239 (1997).
122. See supra Part II.C.
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indifferent to this right, at the expense of the deserving American family.' 23
Endorsing the right to protect oneself and one's family is a difficult position
to contradict. Through this argument, gun advocates have dressed gun
ownership in the most respectable of clothes. This dress makes the right to
own guns today seem more palatable, if not completely sensible, while
drawing our attention from some of the very tangible effects-and subtle
underpinnings-of gun ownership.
Carl T. Bogus, for instance, argues that gun ownership among whites
correlates with racial prejudice, in effect perpetuating the racial subjugation
that helped to create the Cult of the Colt in American history. Professor
Bogus cites the work of Robert Louis Young:
Gun ownership, as a response to crime, is not born of fear but of
anger and a desire for the means to retaliate. Those who fear
criminals buy locks, burglar alarms and watchdogs. Those who
loathe criminals buy guns. Those who hate blacks are likely to feel
a deeper hatred for imagined criminals and are therefore more
likely to own guns than those who do not. 124
These gun owners thus embrace the mythology of their predecessors, in that
their guns serve as much as a political and cultural weapon as a physical
one.125
Indeed, as Young's argument demonstrates, the line between defensive
or retaliatory action and offensive attack can blur in the context of race. One
striking example is the case of Bernhard Goetz. Goetz, while in a New York
City subway car, was approached by four black youths who asked him for
five dollars.' 21 In response to their request, and his perceived threat of
attack, he shot each youth repeatedly, permanently disabling one.' 27 His
response to the perceived threat was far greater than what many would
consider purely defensive. However, the reasonableness of his actions
would be viewed through race-tinged lenses. "[F]or many Americans, crime
has a black face,"' 28 Jody Armour explains. His actions were found
123. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 459.
124. ROBERT Louis YOUNG, RACE, SEX, AND GUNS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FIREARMS
OWNERSHIP 5 (1982), cited in Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365, 1387
(1993).
125. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 591 (1991) (describing gun owners that view ownership as a
political expression).
126. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 783 (1994).
127. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF- DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 1-2 (1988).
128. Armour, supra note 126, at 787.
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reasonable, 129 and Goetz was acquitted, 130 a verdict that a great majority of
the city supported.
131
Through his trial, in fact, Goetz became a media celebrity championing
the cause of self-armament. He was a vocal proponent of the "fundamental
human right of self-protection" and strongly advocated for distribution of an
additional 25,000 guns to trained citizens.1 32 It was not long, however,
before Goetz's race politics would explicitly color his call for self-arming.
A neighbor, Myra Friedman, repeated Goetz's racist views, among them his
belief that 14th Street needed to be cleansed of the "spics and niggers."
' 133
With that revelation, Goetz's call for his right to bear arms for self-defense
dissolved into what Young has suggested is often a racially motivated
ambition to hurt others rather than to defend oneself.
134
To be sure, many in the public viewed the verdict as a statement on the
"moral value" of black victims.' 35 Representative Albert Vann, from
Brooklyn, explained "[i]f Goetz was a black man who shot four white
youths on a subway train, there would be no doubt about the verdict. The
Goetz case is just more evidence that blacks are not safe in New York
City. ' 136 Self-defense arguments that may seem to work in a benign, race-
neutral manner for white America, in other words, take on a significantly
different meaning in the context of black-white interactions. "It may well be
true," George Fletcher explains, "that racial fears invariably infuse routine
judgments in American society about what kinds of acts are self-
129. Armour explains that the Reasonable Racist may have beliefs that blacks are more
dangerous out of true prejudice. This irrational response may still be reasonable, as it is a response
that many "similarly situated" Americans have also had. See id.
130. The trial itself was rife with racist intent. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 127. The
defense, without once making verbal reference to race, managed to evoke racist fears by use of role-
play and innuendo. For demonstration of the bullets' path, defense counsel specifically requested
four black Guardian Angels, in order to make the menacing presence of black men all the more
palpable. Id. at 207. Description of the crime scene and the four victims had a pregnant subtext.
"[Counsel's] strategy of relentlessly attacking the 'gang of four,' 'the predators' on society, calling
them 'vultures' and 'savages,' carried undeniable racial undertones. These verbal attacks signaled a
perception of the four youths as representing something more than four individuals committing an
act of aggression against a defendant. That 'something more' requires extrapolation from their
characteristics to the class of individuals for which they stand. There is no doubt that one of the
characteristics that figures in this implicit extrapolation is their blackness." Id. at 206.
131. Id. at 199.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. Young, supra note 124.
135. FLETCHER, supra note 127, at 203 ("[M]any segments of the public would invariably read
the verdict as a public declaration on the moral value of the black victims.").
136. Id. at 199.
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defense."'' 37
3. The Role of the NRA and Gun Advocacy
Gun advocates argue that more guns will reduce crime and increase
self-protection. Vigorous marketing, by groups such as the NRA, both
creates and sustains the desire for guns as a mythologized symbol of
individualism and self-protection. 3s This marketing also romanticizes "the
culture of martial virtue and frontier independence that the gun
connotes."'1 39 Certainly, if racial minorities are tacitly-and sometimes
explicitly-perceived as savages, 140 the frontier man is the required
counterpart within the Cult of the Colt. The NRA provides the gun, and the
mythologized culture it represents, to all willing Americans, and it does so
by routinely exploiting fears of crime in a heavily racialized manner. NRA
propaganda urgently wams of "stranger danger" and argues that self-
protection is not just a right, indirectly invoking pre-Heller misperceptions
of Second Amendment jurisprudence,' 4 ' but a responsibility. 142 In its
portrayals of the "enemy" against whom guns will be used, the NRA has
juxtaposed frightening scenarios with photos of black men. 143
Furthermore, the gun lobby has fed the struggle between its suburban
and rural white membership and the black underclass, championing its own
romanticized Second Amendment rights over the clear results of gun
violence. As Andrew Herz argues, "[t]he pleasure of more efficient or
pleasurable hunting and target competition weapons is seen to outweigh the
hundred of lives lost to semi-automatic gunfire."' 144 Herz cites Paul
137. Id. at 203.
138. "The positive social meaning of guns is sustained by the market, which simultaneously
exploits and creates the appetite to share in the culture of martial virtue and frontier independence
that the gun connotes." Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 455.
139. Id.
140. Throughout the Goetz case, for example, the four black victims were "relentlessly"
characterized as "savages," "vultures," and "predators on society". See Armour, supra note 126, at
784; FLETCHER, supra note 127, at 206.
141. Robert R. Simpson, former partner at Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., explained, "[T]he
reason why you have the public perception that the Second Amendment provides an individual right
to bear arms is due, in large part, to the NRA and their tremendous lobbying efforts and
propaganda...it is not the law." Symposium Dialogue: Guns and Liability in America, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1425, 1435 (2000).
142. Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
351, 356-57 (1997).
143. Bogus describes the NRA reaction to the L.A. riots as an exploitation of racial fears.
Advertisements included color photos of black rioters. Bogus, supra note 124, at 1366.
144. Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness And Dereliction Of
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Blackman, an NRA research coordinator, who dismisses gun violence as
affecting only those who have illegally acquired a gun. The racist
underpinnings of NRA rhetoric are highlighted in Blackman's assertion.
The NRA engages in a "chilly" dismissal of the deaths of "bad" kids and
"[t]urns a blind eye to the hundreds of utterly innocent children of color
slain and injured each year by random gunfire." 145 The cost to certain
members of society is simply unworthy of notice or redress.
This sentiment is expressed throughout the rhetoric of gun advocates. If
gun advocates are not disregarding urban casualties, they are appealing to
legislatures not to punish good law-abiding Americans by disarming the
whole nation because of the actions of the unruly. Virtuous white citizens
are pitted against the mayhem of black gun ownership. Former U.S. House
Representative Randy (Duke) Cunningham of San Diego shared this
viewpoint in not as few words:
I went to [Senator Charles] Schumer's district, and I understand
why he hates guns. They have all the projects and they shoot each
other, and they do drugs, and they kill each other, and that is bad.
But the answer is not just to be negative, but to look and see what
is reasonable.
146
Interestingly, even gun advocates' interest in the safety of white suburbs has
yielded to their desire to perpetuate the cultural values that inform the
mythology of gun ownership. Professor Kahan explains,
Indeed, when gun control proponents tried to leverage national
anguish over recent school yard shootings into stricter gun control
laws, control opponents in the House of Representatives countered
with a Kulturkampf Blitzkrieg, linking gun control to abortion,
promiscuity, irreligiosity, and myriad other practices and policies
perceived to be threatening to their constituents' cultural
identities. 
147
These cultural identities, which find expression in calls for the right to bear
arms for self-defense, have been nourished by the nation's racialized
constitutional history.
B. The Racialized Constitution- "Defective from the start"
During the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution, Justice
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57, 115 (1995).
145. Id. at 116.
146. 145 CONG. REC. H4371 (daily ed. June 16, 1999), quoted in Kahan, Deterrence, supra
note 78, at 458 n. 225.
147. Kahan, Deterrence, supra note 78, at 461.
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Thurgood Marshall described the ideological weaknesses of the putatively
exalted document crafted and adopted by the founders. "[T]he government
they devised was defective from the start," he explained, "requiring several
amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the
system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today.' 48 Intentional
omissions of women and blacks were a testament to the fact that the
Constitution was a moral and ideological failure until the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, the Constitution sanctioned, through slavery, direct and indirect
propagation of racism. First, the slaveholding South exercised its power
through the Importation Clause, 149 which directly limited the otherwise
expansive commerce clause. The South only agreed to give Congress such
expansive commerce power in exchange for the perpetuation of the slave
trade, in the short term, and indefinite perpetuation of slavery. 150 In
addition, compromises resulted in slaves being considered three-fifths of a
person in the eyes of the polity.' 5 1 The three-fifths compromise provided
political protection for slavery as it bolstered the number of Representatives
the South could enjoy in the House and in the Electoral College while
simultaneously devaluing the slaves' humanity as a matter of law.'
5 2
Further, the Fugitive Slave Clause limited the movement of slaves de jure,
and African Americans de facto, throughout the nation.153 These
constitutional compromises 154 had profound effects, immediately and in the
148. Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's Bicentennial: Commemorating the Wrong
Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1987).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the
Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each person." ld.
150. Marshall, supra note 148, at 1338.
151. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (The Three-Fifths Clause). "Representatives and direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons." Id. (emphasis added).
152. See discussion of slavery and the Constitution in J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and
Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1707-08 (1997).
153. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (The Fugitive Slave Clause). "No Person held to Service or
Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to whom such Service of Labour may be due." Id.
154. It is important to note that these compromises-the Fugitive Slave Clause, fashioned for
slavery, as well as the federal commerce powers-were in direct contradiction to the States' rights
stance that the South staunchly advocated.
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long term. For example, the Importation Clause allowed the importation of
roughly as many Africans to America from 1780 to 1810 as in the 160 years
of prior American involvement in the slave trade.
1 55
In short, prior to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution actively worked to perpetuate the slave machine. Even sections
of the document that did not explicitly make reference to slavery were
crafted, at least in part, with a goal of maintaining that practice. For
instance, Article IV, Section 4 states, "The United States... shall protect
each [state] ... against invasion; and ... against domestic violence."' 156 The
inclusion of the term "domestic violence" is almost a direct reference to the
potential for slave uprisings. In explaining his support for the Importation
Clause, 157 Luther Martin, a delegate to Maryland's ratifying convention,
explained that unlimited importation would increase the threat of slave
revolts. 158 Martin went on to draw an explicit connection between such a
threat and the constitutional protection against "domestic violence":
It was further urged that, by this system of government, every
State is to be protected both from foreign invasion and from
domestic insurrections; that, from this consideration, it was of the
utmost importance it should have a power to restrain the
importation of slaves; since in proportion as the number of slaves
are increased in any State, in the same proportion the State is
weakened .... 159
Even the Constitution's putative limitation on slavery in the Importation
Clause ensures that the slaveholding states would enjoy the domestic
tranquility guaranteed by Article IV, Section 4.
As Martin and other delegates to the ratifying conventions recognized,
slavery was becoming increasingly unwieldy, 160 as the slave population was
growing such that it would outnumber white Americans in the South. The
southern states began to deem the large percentage of slaves, and the ever-
increasing potential of slave revolt, as a "domestic security risk, 1 6 1 against
which they would need protection. That protection took the form of
155. Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a
Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REv. 93, 96 n.12 (1989).
156. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 4.
157. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
158. Diamond, supra note 155, at 117 n.135.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 115.
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measured importation, in part regulated by Constitutional provision. 162 In
addition, the Constitution protected the southern states through the
sanctioning of the militia under the Second Amendment. In guaranteeing the
right of the states to be armed and organized in defense against domestic
threats, the Second Amendment is certainly related to the protection of the
states against the sort of "domestic violence" feared by Martin.
C. Black America, Guns, and the Second Amendment -From Slavery to
Jim Crow
The Second Amendment is inextricably entangled in the historical
struggle between white property owners and African Americans. We can
only understand the purposes, motivations, and consequences of the Second
Amendment if we first understand the origins and the evolution of the
militia system and its Southern counterpart, the slave patrols, and the failure
of the republican promise. Understanding these elements colors the way in
which we read the right to bear arms. Originally, the militia was meant to
protect white settler communities from Native Americans. The growing
number of enslaved Africans, however, soon supplanted the threat of the
Native Americans, and the emergent mythology of the gun was nourished
by the explicit link between gun ownership and the ability for solitary white
slaveholders to resist uprisings by their slaves. Professor Slotkin quotes
from an early Colt promotional statement, published in the 1838 Journal of
the American Institute, providing the following creation narrative:
Mr. Colt happened to be near the scene of a sanguinary
insurrection of negro slaves, in the Southern district of Virginia.
He was startled to think against what fearful odds the white planter
must ever contend, thus surrounded by a swarming population of
slaves. What defense could there be in one shot, when opposed to
multitudes, even though multitudes of the unarmed? The master
and his family were certain to be massacred. Was there no way,
thought Mr. Colt, of enabling the planter to repose in peace? no
[sic] longer to feel that to be attacked, was to be at once and
inevitably destroyed? that [sic] no resistance could avail, were the
negroes once spirited up to revolt?... The boy's ingenuity was
from that moment on the alert.1 63
Aware of the threats created by slave uprisings and Indian attacks on the
frontier, Samuel Colt shrewdly targeted his first marketing "toward outfits
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
163. Slotkin, supra note 8, at 59 (citation omitted). Slotkin notes that the insurrection to which
the quoted material refers was most likely the Nat Turner Rebellion of 1832. Id. at 60.
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like the Texas Rangers (whose enemies were Indians armed with bows or
single-shot muskets) and toward Southern planters."1 64
Even before Colt had been inspired to protect the Southern planters,
however, the militia system had adapted to the needs of the slave-holding
society.165 That adaptation took the form of slave patrols, commissioned to
maintain order through terror. This and the following section explore the
political and philosophical impulses-the precursors of today's gun
culture-at the time of drafting the Second Amendment and reveal a
racialized intent behind the Amendment. Indeed, a brief history of varied
cultural interpretations of the Amendment vis-A-vis African Americans
demonstrates the ways in which such interpretation intimately affected the
condition of blacks throughout America.
1. "To The Security of the Master and the Public Tranquility"
166
Disarmed Slaves and Freedmen
From the dawn of colonialism, white slave traders had a definitive
advantage in weaponry over natives. Bogus explains, "The non-white world
literally found itself looking down the barrel of a gun."'1 67 The helplessness
of Africans in America, with respect to weapons, made their enslavement
much easier. Despite this disadvantage, Africans often rebelled. Prior to
1860, there were at least 200 reported slave revolts,1 68 even with slave
owners' and overseers' strict disarmament measures. As a result, slave
revolts were a constant fear. White fears inspired innumerable de facto and
de jure attempts at keeping black men and women, slave or free, impotent.
That fear inspired the slave patrols, of which even the most indolent would
mobilize to "ketch a nigger."1 69 The willingness of whites to use violence to
164. Id. at 59.
165. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 355 (1965).
166. North Carolina's highest court explained in 1829 that whites' "dominion" over slaves "is
essential to the value of slave as property, to the security of the master, and the public tranquility,
greatly dependent upon their subordination; and in fine, as most effectually securing the general
protection and comfort of the slaves themselves." State v. John Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 265 (1829).
167. Bogus, supra note 124, at 1369. The advantage gained by European use of weaponry is
immeasurable and aided in the methodical subjugation of most of the inhabited land over the next
two centuries. See JARED DIAMOND, GuNS, GERMS, AND STEEL 76 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1999)
("By the 1700s, guns had replaced swords as the main weapon favoring European invaders over
Native Americans and other native peoples.").
168. HERBERT APTHEKER, NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1526-1860, at II
(Int'l Publishers 1939).
169. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to be Applied to the White
Population:" Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South 's Legacy to a
National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1319 n.71 (1995) [hereinafter Cottrol &
Diamond, "Never Intended to be Applied"].
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keep the enslaved or displaced in their abject position added to the unequal
access to arms and ensured white supremacy for the early nation.
The South was the pioneer of gun legislation. 170 Besides the fact that
guns were a part of the "lawways and folkways" of the South, Cottrol and
Diamond explain that white domination was crucial to the maintenance of
order in America's "first truly multiracial society."'171 During the early
nineteenth century, throughout the South, laws proliferated that limited gun
ownership to free white men. For example, Tennessee explicitly limited the
right to that dominant group. 172 Mississippi prohibited gun ownership for
both slaves and free blacks.' 73 In South Carolina, slaves were only able to
handle guns with written permission, and slave owners were required to
search slave quarters for guns. 174
With respect to free blacks, state restrictions were often ambivalent. In
South Carolina, for example, despite having the most severe slave codes, the
legislature armed free blacks to help oversee the large slave population. 75
This was not unusual, as a number of slave states in the antebellum South
allowed free blacks to serve as members of the militia. 176 Moreover, in both
the North and the South, free blacks were armed militia members during
times of invasion.177 However, Whites soon deemed free blacks a dangerous
influence on the enslaved. This fear was exacerbated by slave rebellions
uprisings, and conspiracies-particularly the Nat Turner Rebellion in
183 1.178
During this time, free blacks needed arms to protect themselves from
the added danger of being kidnapped and sold into slavery. 179 However,
southern legislatures curtailed free blacks' access to arms. State provisions
included severe penalties, from summary punishment for arms possession to
170. Id. at 1318.
171. Id. at 1318-19.
172. Id. at 1317.
173. Id.
174. Bogus, supra note 124, at 1370 n.31.
175. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 326 (1991) [hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, The
Second Amendment].
176. Id. at 331.
177. Id. at 332.
178. See Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 17,
18 (1995) (discussing the Tumer Rebellion as an impetus for the increase in irrational fear among
white Southerners).
179. Id. at 20.
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the death penalty for slaves or free blacks who shot at a white person. 8 ° The
state courts often unapologetically supported the position of the legislature.
For example, in response to a disarmament measure, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina insisted that the law's "only object is to preserve the peace
and safety of the community from being disturbed by an indiscriminate use
on ordinary occasions, by free men of color, of fire arms or other arms of an
offensive character. Self preservation is the first law of nations, as it is of
individuals."1
8
'
Though purposeful black disarmament was limited to the South, blacks
in the North also needed easier access to weapons because of the lack of
police protection against mob violence. Blacks could and often did form
private militias.' 82 However, though black self-armament sometimes
succeeded as a deterrent, whites often violently suppressed these efforts.
The September 1841 conflict in Cincinnati is paradigmatic of the relative
impotence of blacks throughout antebellum America, even outside of the
South. Blacks retaliating against white aggressions faced a six-pound
cannon. 83 After the militia took control, all blacks were disarmed and taken
into protective custody. 84 Like their Southern counterparts, Northern blacks
were left vulnerable to racist vigilantism and dependent upon a malevolently
disinterested local government. i85
2. Early Reconstruction Empowerment and Late Reconstruction
Disarmament
Unfettered access to weapons seemed to be the necessary tool for
blacks to effect political participation and power, as well as a practical
means of keeping the recently emancipated free from future harassment or
bondage. In theory, the acknowledgment of black citizenship could be
expressed by extending a right to guns to all citizens. Further, divorcing that
right from the purpose of militia preparedness might provide an individual
180. Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 336.
181. State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 251 (1844). The disarmament act in question was entitled
"an act to prevent free persons of color from carrying fire arms." Id. at 250.
182. Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 341.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 342.
185. Cottrol and Diamond assert, "The 1841 Cincinnati riot represents the tragic, misguided
irony of the city's authorities who, concerned with the safety of the black population chose to
disarm and imprison them--chose, in effect, to leave the black population of Cincinnati as southern
authorities left the black population in slave states, naked to whatever indignities private parties
might heap upon them, and dependent on a government either unable or unwilling to protect their
rights." Id.
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right for the newly emancipated.
Akhil Amar argues that the early Reconstruction period witnessed a
conceptual change in the reading of the Second Amendment, necessarily
impacting the political discourse surrounding a right to bear arms. At this
time there was a definitive individualization of the Second Amendment in
response to the needs of new citizens. In interpreting the Amendment, there
was, Amar explains, a "shift from 'keep' to 'own,' from 'bear' to 'carry,'
from 'arms' to 'firearms,' from 'militia' to 'persons,' and from collective
self-defense ('the security of a free state') to individualized self-defense."1 86
For the safety and dignity of blacks, ardent Reconstructionists liberalized
the Amendment. 187 The safety and dignity of blacks, however, would
quickly come under attack.
a. Vigilante, Extralegal, and Ad Hoc Legal Attempts to Disarm
Violent opposition met federal attempts at ameliorating the lot of the
newly emancipated. Again, a fear of insurrection, as well as a newly
perceived threat of the "collision" of races,' 88 fueled vigilante efforts to
disable attempts at black self-empowerment. Whites would organize as
militias for the purpose of exacting compliance with white supremacy.' 89
Major General Carl Shurz detailed abuses, including the deprivation of
arms-bearing. 190 Moreover, Major General Shurz described the organized
militias as the "greatest evils" confronting the freedmen. 191 To the extent
186. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 266 (1998).
187. Halbrook, supra note 117, at 369. While the zealous Reconstructionists were driven by a
strong sense of moral decency they freed one group, while continuing to ignore, if not virtually
destroy, another. Id. Their treatment of Native Americans is most notable. Id. Halbrook explains,
Some Western Senators wished to exclude Indians, as well as Chinese, from being
considered citizens, partly because citizens had a right to bear arms, a right not to be
accorded to Indians. The oppression of Native Americans and the seizure of their
lands proceeded in earnest. Accordingly, the Senate voted to define all persons born in
the United States, without distinction of color, as citizens, "excluding Indians not
taxed."
Id.
188. Id. at 348.
189. Id. at 353 n.53.
190. Halbrook, supra note 117, at 354. (Report of Major General Carl Shurz, whom President
Johnson had sent to tour the South, transmitted to the Senate by Johnson (Dec. 13, 1865)).
191. Id. at 368 n.134.
I am convinced that these militia organizations only endanger the peace of the
communities where they exist, and are a source of constant annoyance and injury to
the freed people; that herein is one of the greatest evils existing in the southern States
for the freedmen. They give the color of law to their violent, unjust, and sometimes
inhuman proceedings.
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that they were disarming freedmen, they were acting wisely in the eyes of
many, including lawmakers. Senator Saulsbury, an unabashedly racist
Representative from Delaware, opposed a Civil Rights Bill that would
prohibit the disarmament of the freedmen by states.' 92 At the same time,
Senator Saulsbury invoked the Second Amendment for the protection of
"the whole white population" to arm themselves and organize into
militias. 193
Notwithstanding the attempts to thwart militia aggression and to
empower blacks through legal access to self-protection (and, by extension,
self-preservation and personal liberty) the South attempted to effectuate a
new form of slavery articulated in the "Black Codes." Described as a
"twilight zone between slavery and freedom,"'194 the Black Codes were
passed on the heels of the Civil War. Among these codes were laws that
forbade blacks not in the military from carrying firearms and laws
prohibiting whites from lending weapons or ammunition to free blacks or
Mulattoes.'95 One law, Florida's Act of 1893, had the explicit purpose of
disarming blacks only, though it was couched as a broad gun control act.196
Concurring in the Florida Supreme Court's 1941 opinion in Watson v.
Stone, Justice Buford stated explicitly that the purpose of the act was "to
give white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of security. The
statute was never intended to be applied to the white population and in
practice has never been so applied."'197 These laws were glaring attempts at
subjugating blacks, and they were successful. 9 '
This legal disarmament led to continued oppression by extralegal
entities. The Ku Klux Klan and similar renegade groups emerged as the
neo-slave patrols at the close of the Civil War. Driven by their self-
proclaimed "patriotic mission," these private organizations replaced the
State arm of suppression.'99 The early Klansmen and nightriders actively
confiscated arms from blacks at all costs. 200 In the early 1900s, throughout
Id.
192. Id. at 383-84.
193. Id.
194. See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 344 (citing KENNETH
STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 80 (1965)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941).
198. See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 344.
199. Id.
200. Cottrol & Diamond, "Never Intended to be Applied, "supra note 169, at 1333.
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the North and South, states with a significant Klan population adopted laws
limiting blacks' access to guns, either through explicit gun regulations or by
laws giving local officials wide discretion in granting licenses for
firearms.20 1 In addition to disarmament, lynching became the new form of
physical degradation to which these extralegal entities subjected blacks.
Between 1882 and 1968, lynching became a frequent occurrence.20 2 Blacks
were often lynched for the pettiest social transgressions. Headlines
described lynching for blacks for being too familiar with white women and
even for hiring a lawyer for a property dispute.
20 3
b. State Laws, Local Enforcement, and Federal Law
Local law enforcement often ignored such blatant cruelty, with
Southern officials routinely circumventing protection of freedmen and
enforcement of federal law. Many laws were administered unevenly. For
example, the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that blacks and whites
should be treated equally led to the passage of several restrictive gun laws
that were "equal in the letter of the law, but unequally enforced. '20 4 The
state courts were, unsurprisingly, complicit. Justice Buford's oft-quoted
concurrence in Watson v. Stone, discussed briefly above, concluded with the
declaration that restrictive gun control had never been applied to the white
population, and that the court would do nothing to redress that failure in the
law's application.20 5
While federal prosecutors brought many cases against white defendants
under the new postbellum civil rights laws, the Supreme Court would do no
better in protecting blacks against local aggressions. For example, in United
States v. Cruikshank, the Court had the opportunity to find an individual
right to arms, thus allowing the black men and women for whom this case
was brought to find legal protection against vigilante disarmament. 0 6 The
defendant was Klansman William Cruikshank, who was indicted for
banding together with the intent to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
two citizens of "African descent. °20 7 The Court held that because the
Constitution did not guarantee a right of "bearing arms for a lawful
purpose," the count charging Cruikshank with disarmament of those black
201. Polsby & Kates, Jr., supra note 121, at 1267.
202. See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 351-52.
203. Id. at 352-53.
204. Cramer, supra note 178, at 20.
205. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941).
206. See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). See also supra Part ll.1.
207. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.
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citizens was "defective." 208 Cruikshank, used today to bolster the legal
arguments of gun control advocates, thus has its history in blacks' crippled
access to guns terribly needed for self-protection during the volatile
Reconstruction period.
c. Early Black Self-Armament
While whites in the Colonial period embraced the Cult of the Colt as a
means of achieving "equality" with and superiority over Indians, slaves, and
freed blacks, African Americans were compelled to embrace a similar belief
in the gun as equalizer after the Civil War. Confronted, often violently, with
continuing disparities in power and civil rights-disparities that the law
would not or could not address-black Americans looked to the model of
self-defense so vigorously embraced by white gun owners. Consequently,
over the next several decades many black activists, from W.E.B. DuBois to
the prominent figures of the Civil Rights Movement, called for black self-
armament. 209
From the moment of emancipation, "the right to bear arms was
defended in black newspapers., 210 The LOYAL GEORGIAN, a prominent
black newspaper during Reconstruction, was vociferously in support of the
right to bear arms, which would be used purely for defensive purposes.
21
'
During Reconstruction, many Congressional Republicans similarly believed
that it would be more difficult for freedmen to be terrorized if they were
capable of"returning fire."212 However, in light of the racist opposition with
which they were faced, armed blacks served more as an important symbol
than as a formidable deterrent. For example, even in the absence of such
deterrence, the "victim perseverance" that blacks demonstrated was vital to
discredit the Ku Klux Klan. 213 "Guns gave victim groups the courage and
the means to sustain themselves in the face of KKK threat and police
indifference or hostility. '2 14 However, black men and women could not
effect total emancipation through the gun alone.
208. Id. at 553.
209. David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the
Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 445 (1999) [hereinafter
Williams, Constitutional Tales]. See infra Part III.D.
210. Halbrook, supra note 117, at 381 (quoting DOROTHY STERLING, THE TROUBLE THEY
SEEN: BLACK PEOPLE TELL THE STORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 394 (1976)).
211. Halbrook, supra note 117, at 381.
212. Cramer, supra note 178, at 20.
213. Polsby & Kates, supra note 121, at 1268.
214. Id.
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The Civil Rights Movement would see a call to arms of a different
nature. Certainly, black activists sought weapons primarily for protection;
however, a growing and vocal minority saw gun access as an opportunity to
wage battles.
D. The Civil Rights Movement
Though the twentieth-century liberation movement is remembered for
the poignant pictures of sit-ins and inspiring speeches on nonviolence and
race reconciliation, guns were certainly a part of that movement. Whether
guns or nonviolent resistance had a greater impact in influencing white
America cannot be known. The Movement will always be marked by "the
quiet dignity" 215 demonstrated by black protestors; at the same time, there
was a less glamorous struggle occurring. The armed movement would grow
out of these skirmishes and the general frustration felt by black Americans
who were met with injury in the face of serenity.
1. The Nonviolence Movement
Martin Luther King, Jr., inspired by the Bible, Christian pacifism, and
the teachings of Mohandas Gandhi, advocated nonviolent and passive
resistance. 216 He preached that any reversion to violence would undermine
the "moral righteousness" of the Movement, threatening any attempts at
gaining sympathy.217 King was not the first to employ this tactic. Glenn
Smiley, the white Fellowship of Reconciliation minister,218 and Bayard
Rustin, a civil rights activist, promoted Gandhi's ideas as a tool for blacks in
America. 2 19 While King's was the most popular voice of this brand of
nonviolent resistance, on the ground and in local coffee shops and stores,
several other morally righteous activists organized and conducted
nonviolent resistance workshops for black and white students.220
215. In a letter to the Advertiser, Juliette Morgan, a white librarian, commented, "It is hard to
imagine a soul so dead, a heart so hard, a vision so blinded and provincial as not to be awed with
admiration at the quiet dignity, discipline and dedication with which the Negroes have conducted
the boycott." JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-1965, at
79 (Penguin Books 1987).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) was an interracial organization, founded in 1914 for
the advancement of pacifism and international understanding. Id. at 125.
219. Id. at 123.
220. James Lawson, a divinity student at Vanderbilt, spread the tactics of nonviolent resistance
in Nashville and across the South by conducting workshops for black and white students; by 1960,
several Southern black campuses were familiar with the nonviolence workshops. WILLIAMS, supra
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The workshops were not for the faint of heart. Students were taught
how best to protect themselves from the likely violent reactions of many
white Southerners. "Nonviolence required compassion, commitment,
courage, and faith, but most importantly, it required discipline." 221 Non-
violent resistance continued to be the most significant part of the Civil
Rights Movement for much of the latter 1950s and early 1960s.2 22 By the
mid-1960s, however, the manner of black protest began to change. 223 New
approaches based on nascent and long-standing ideologies emerged.2 24
Black Nationalism and Black Power, which at times called for full-scale
revolution, would provide alternatives to the nonviolent protest methods,
marches, and court battles.225 As Juan Williams explains, "Nonviolence was
no longer the only tool for change; many blacks had seen too many murders,
too many betrayals." 2
26
2. The Armed Movement
A number of legal scholars argue that the success of the Civil Rights
Movement was made possible, at least in part, by the presence of armed
resistance. 227 In addition, though not at the forefront of the popular
philosophy of the Civil Rights Movement, a number of African
Americans-most notably, the Black Panthers and Malcolm X, both relying
on the Second Amendment-advocated the use of arms for self-defense, if
not for effectuating greater equality.228 Don Kates stated, "I found that the
possession of firearms for self-defense was almost universally endorsed by
the black community, for it could not depend on police protection from the
note 215, at 122-23. In addition, Marion Barry of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), known to be a strong proponent of direct action, coordinated workshops for black
teenagers. Id. at 212-13.
221. Id. at 123.
222. Id. at 287.
223. Id.
224. WILLIAMS, supra note 215, at 287.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 355.
228. African Americans generally tolerated the injustices endured by nonviolent protestors to a
point. "Civil rights workers and the black community generally viewed nonviolence as a useful
tactic for certain situations, not as a moral injunction to let oneself be murdered on a deserted road
in the middle of the night." DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY:
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 338 (Prometheus Books
1992).
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KKK.' ' 2 29 In addition, others argue that the knowledge of black self-
armament deterred greater racist violence. 230 Defensive gun use would
produce at least a stalemate. If a black person answered a Klan gunshot,
often both wculd simply disperse.
231
Organized resistance included armed efforts by Negroes with Guns,
Deacons for Defense and Justice, the Black Panthers, and later the Congress
of Racial Equality (CORE). 232 In addition, the North Carolina chapter of the
NAACP used firearms to discourage the Klan. 233 The Black Panthers
explicitly invoked the individualist view of the right to bear arms to
articulate their pursuit of personal security. Their party platform read,
We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by
organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to
defending our black community from racist police oppression and
brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the US
gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black
people should arm themselves for self-defense.
234
There was certainly ample provocation for organized resistance. Attacks on
the Freedom Riders and nonviolent protesters, the murder of four black girls
in the Birmingham church bombing, the murder of Edgar Veers, and, later,
the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., were among the many egregious
assaults on black people.
Throughout the South, the entire state structure often explicitly favored
whites. Law enforcement encouraged and sometimes facilitated attacks on
nonviolent protesters. Attacks on Freedom Riders would often go
unchecked, at best.2 35 In Enfield, North Carolina, Klan dues were paid and
collected in the police station. 236 The courts, including federal district
229. Williams, Constitutional Tales, supra note 209, at 447.
230. "[There is] no question but that the known existence of pervasive firearms ownership in
Southern Black Communities prevented much (though not all) massively violent racist retaliation."
John R. Salter, Jr., Social Justice Community Organizing and the Necessity for Protecting Firearms,
in THE GuN CULTURE AND ITS ENEMIES.19, 20 (William R. Tonso ed., 1990), quoted in Williams,
Constitutional Tales, supra note 209, at 447 n.363.
231. Cynthia Leonardatos, California 's Attempts to Disarm the Black Panthers, 36 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 947, 953-54 (1999).
232. Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 175, at 357.
233. Id. at 357 n.273.
234. Black Panther Party-Platform and Program, reprinted in REGINALD MAJOR, A
PANTHER IS A BLACK CAT 286 (1971), quoted in Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment,
supra note 175, at 357 n.273 (emphasis added).
235. Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 951.
236. Id. at 951 n.19.
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courts, provided no recourse. United States District Court Judge Cox stated
that students engaging in civil disobedience "must expect to be injured or
killed,' 237 ostensibly without legal remedy. The sentiment of black leaders
in the Movement increasingly began to mirror that of Floyd McKissick, the
Executive Director of CORE. By 1967, McKissick described the tactics of
peaceful civil disobedience, marking the "old-style" movement, as
outdated.238 They needed to be replaced by insurrections inspired by the
"Negro revolution." 239 However, possession of a significant instrument of
empowerment, the gun, would not go unfettered.
3. Mythology in Conflict: Legal Disarmament
In some ways, of course, black leaders calling for black armament were
echoing the values at the heart of the white mythology of gun ownership:
the idea of the armed patriot defending his very existence. Yet this call to
armed self-defense simultaneously resonated with the historical
underpinnings of that white mythology from the violent racial conflict that
spurred Samuel Colt to market his new weapon to Indian fighters taking
possession of the American frontier to slave owners seeking to maintain
control over rebellious slaves.
Despite black leaders' at times explicit invocation of the rhetoric of the
white mythology, the undercurrent of continuing racial conflict meant that
the black use of arms for defensive purposes would not be tolerated
anywhere in the nation. If vigilante efforts to disarm Blacks were
unsuccessful, "legitimate" means were used.240 The actions of the California
state legislature, in response to the Black Panther Party, are an excellent
example of how state structures would disarm blacks by any means
necessary.
In 1966, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the Black Panther
Party for Self-Defense in California. Prior to the 1967 gun control statute,
carrying firearms in public was common in California. With the call to arms
by the Panthers in 1966, the police began confiscating blacks' weapons for
disturbing the peace, as there was no applicable weapons prohibition. Soon
after, then-State Assemblyman Donald Mulford introduced legislation
banning the carrying of firearms within the city limits. 24 1 The time had
237. Id. at 953.
238. Id. at 964.
239. Id.
240. JOHN R. Lorr, JR., MORE GuNs, LESS CRIME 68 (1998) ("Even in the 1960s much of the
increased regulation of firearms stemmed from the fear generated by Black Panthers who openly
carried guns.").
241. Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 970. ("The time has come ... when we have to legislate
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
come with the emergence of the Black Panthers.
In response to this proposal, the Panthers stormed the Assembly
chamber in the Capitol. In a lengthy statement, Bobby Seale harshly
denounced American racism and the California legislature specifically. His
opening statements were as follows:
Statement of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense calls on the
American people in general and the black people in particular to
take full note of the racist California legislature aimed at keeping
the black people disarmed and powerless at the very same time
that racist police agencies throughout the country are intensifying
the terror and repression of black people. 242
After Seale read his statement, the Panthers were removed from the Capitol.
While being removed, the Panthers vociferously claimed their Second
Amendment rights, shouting that they had a constitutional right to bear
arms. Then-Govemor Ronald Reagan, at the Capitol when the group was
removed, agreed that they did have a right to bear arms, but insisted that
carrying loaded weapons on the street was a "ridiculous way to solve
problems that have to be solved among people of good will .... Americans
don't go around carrying guns with the idea of using them to influence other
Americans."24
3
Reagan's comments set the stage for a distinction that would be
embraced by the mythology of American gun ownership: a distinction
between puerile foolishness by blacks,244 and the mature and responsible
gun ownership by law-abiding (white) citizens. 245 The 1967 bill was
undoubtedly meant to disproportionately affect black protestors. Mulford
later affirmed that the invasion of the Capitol inspired him to toughen the
bill, 246 virtually admitting his intentions to disarm a discrete group.247
against carrying or exhibiting guns in public places.").
242. Id. at 971.
243. Id. at 972.
244. At a press conference on May 9, 1967, Governor Reagan addressed possible repeal or
revision of state law allowing the Panthers to enter the Capitol. "The idea in a country like ours that
grown men and women think they have got to run around playing cowboys with guns on their belts.
They come in and try to impress a legislature. If it wasn't so terribly serious, you'd have to laugh at
it, but it is terribly serious .... Id. at 972 n.145.
245. Id. at 980. At a press conference held on May 9, 1967, Ronald Reagan signaled his
support of the California gun bill by stating, "[t]he first thing any real sportsman learns is to carry an
empty gun until he gets to the place where he's going to do the shooting. So this would work no
hardship on the honest citizen." Id.
246. Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 971-72.
247. Then-Assemblyman Willie Brown thought that the bill might be racially motivated.
Mulford had opposed similar gun control measures, "until Negroes showed up in Oakland-his
district-with arms and then he [sought] restrictive legislation." Leonardatos, supra note 231, at
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On July 26, 1967, three days after the start of the Detroit riots, the
California State Senate passed the Gun Control Statute.248 Governor Reagan
approved it two days later and the law took effect immediately. Section 6 of
the Act of July 28, 1967, stated explicitly,
This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace... The State of California has
witnessed, in recent years, the increasing incidence of organized
groups and individuals publicly arming themselves for purposes
inimical to the peace and safety of the people of California.2 49
As a result of this measure, the Panthers were no longer a serious threat. A
known or suspected Panther could be stopped and searched for a weapon on
city streets.250 Prohibited gun possession was only a misdemeanor, but it
was often used to trump up other charges or simply for the purpose of
harassment.2 5
California was not alone in its legal disarming; the federal government
followed suit with the Gun Control Act of 1968. This act prohibited the
Saturday Night Special, a cheaper gun used primarily by African
Americans.2 52 One journalist argued that this act, in no uncertain terms, was
written as a gun control measure but was passed to control blacks. 253 The
effect of armament, especially considering the ease with which legal access
to guns was curbed, remains uncertain.
Whether the armed civil rights movement was more effective than the
non-violent approach is an important inquiry that is beyond the scope of this
973.
248. Id. at 976. Leonardatos hypothesizes that the statute was a preemptive strike by the
legislature in response to a real grassroots movement rather than an isolated act of mayhem, like the
1965 Watts riots. Id.
249. Act of July 28, 1967, ch. 960, § 6 1967 Cal. Stat. 2459-63.
250. Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 987.
251. Id. at 987. It is interesting to note that the NRA opposed the restrictive law, of course,
advocating another approach. Cynthia Leonardatos explained, "the NRA advocated the idea that
groups of armed civilian posses should be dispatched into the communities during times of unrest to
stop citizens bent on violence and destruction." Id. at 980. Consistent with their affinity for racist
innuendo, the NRA advocated a modem day militia to quash unruly Black activism. Recognizing
the danger to gun advocacy of allowing such contentious and inflammatory ideology to go
unchecked, Reagan generally denounced vigilante justice. Id. at 980 n. 189.
252. Cramer, supra note 178, at 21.
253. Robert Sherill, at one time a correspondent for The Nation, speculated that the Gun
Control Act of 1968 forbidding the Saturday Night Special was as a result of a fear of armed blacks.
"The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed not to control guns but to control blacks, and inasmuch
as a majority of Congress did not want to do the former but were ashamed to show that their goal
was the latter, the result was that they did neither. Indeed, this law, the first gun-control law passed
by Congress in thirty years, was one of the grand jokes of our time." ROBERT SHERILL, THE
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 280 (1973), quoted in Cramer, supra note 178, at 21.
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article. We do know that black self-armament encouraged stricter gun
control provisions, state and federal. We also know that something was lost
in the movement with the introduction of an armed agenda. The latter-day
consequences of guns in black communities would be severe. In a poignant
example, Huey Newton was shot and killed by a low-level drug dealer in
1989.254 Newton went from being at the forefront of the right to bear arms
for common defense liberation to becoming a statistic in a city that is still
racked by gun violence.
In a frightening shift, blacks' self-armament in the last two decades has
been another instrument of oppression rather than liberty. As gun-related
violence in America has increased, African Americans in urban
communities disproportionately feel the devastation. Instead of African
Americans looking down the barrel of white guns, the perpetrators of gun
oppression are other African Americans. 255 The racialized rhetoric and
mythology of the Second Amendment, however, have rendered white
America complicit with respect to this crisis.
In light of this phenomenon, this article turns now to a consideration of
how, building on Professor Kahan's call for a change in the terms of the gun
policy debate, scholars and policymakers might affect true reform and bring
an end to the havoc that guns have wrought and continue to wreak in black
America.
V. REFORMING GuN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Mark Tushnet's recent analysis of the gun policy debate, Out of Range,
has a telling subtitle: Why the Constitution Can't End the Battle Over
Guns.256 Like Kahan, Tushnet acknowledges that the debate's true focus lies
in cultural values.257 Kahan argues for the efficacy of a "moderate middle"
that can somehow assuage the cultural anxieties and protect the cultural
identities of both sides of the debate,258 a position that gravitates toward
notions of compromise and neutrality. Tushnet declares that in a "cultural
254. Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 957 n.51. It is also important to note that many of the
particularly inflammatory speeches during the late sixties had the effect of inciting riots, destruction,
and confrontation within black communities. After one such speech in Cambridge, during the week
of the Detroit riots, flames engulfed the Black ghetto and the activist was arrested for incitement to
riot. See id. at 965. The necessary end result of advocating violence is the destruction of Black
communities, and one's own arrest.
255. "We know that the statistics tell us that black crime is usually committed against the
black community." FLETCHER, supra note 127, at 200 (quoting Sherrye Henry, a talk show host).
256. TUSHNET, supra note 76.
257. Id. at xiv. See also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
258. See Braman & Kahan, Overcoming the Fear, supra note 89.
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wars battle," such as the gun debate, "neutrality is probably impossible." 259
"Even to stand apart from a particular battle," according to Tushnet, "is to
take a position."260
This section argues that taking the work of Kahan and his colleagues to
its most valuable policy conclusion means recognizing that "moderate
middle" compromises in the gun debate ultimately are "identity
protective"261 in only the most cosmetic sense. Such compromises typically
devolve, by political necessity, into "free-lunch" propositions that permit
both sides to claim at least partial victory but that accomplish "incremental"
policy benefits, at best. 262 Perhaps the most baneful consequence of these
compromises is not that their "moderate middle" stances ultimately are
illusory, but rather that their political "solution" masks the deep and
continuing cultural-and specifically, racial-conflict that nurtures and
perpetuates the nation's gun culture in the first place. 263 As Tushnet argues,
neutrality is not a viable position in a "culture wars battle" with that conflict
at its heart.264
This article thus proposes, in response to Kahan's call for a
simultaneously re-formed and identity-protective gun debate, that reform
can result only from deep, systemic changes in American policy and culture.
In other words, as Tushnet recognizes, true gun control is not likely to
derive from "gun control. '265 Rather than attempting to find compromise
positions, this section argues that real progress in the nation's gun policy
depends in large part upon convincing those who embrace the mythology of
259. TUSHNET, supra note 76, at xv.
260. Id.
261. Kahan et al., supra note 91, at 497.
262. Zimring, supra note 88, at 33. See also TUSHNET, supra note 76, at 75-77 (assessing three
possibilities for reform to gun control policy-licensing requirements for concealed weapons, safe
storage laws, and enhanced enforcement of existing laws-and suggesting that none of the three is
likely to accomplish real results, aside from boosting the fundraising capabilities of the
organizations that push for their adoption).
263. Zimring, supra note 88, at 33. Professor Zimring thus observes that while free-lunch
rhetoric makes for "good politics," it simultaneously removes from discussion "realistic analysis of
the impacts of specific [gun] control strategies." Id.
264. TuSHNET, supra note 76, at 75-77.
265. Tushnet writes,
The sources of violence are deeply rooted enough in culture and psychology that
adding or dropping specific gun control requirements is quite unlikely to make much
difference. Perhaps paradoxically, advocates of gun control might actually be
impeding the adoption of more effective policies for reducing violence. . . . Take the
issue of gun control off the political agenda, and those interested in reducing violence
might win more elections ....
Id. at xvii.
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gun ownership that protecting home and hearth-and thus protecting their
cultural identities-must not be a matter of arming themselves against some
consciously perceived or unconsciously felt racial threat. Accomplishing
that goal will be no small task: writ large, it will mean ending racial tensions
and biases in the United States.
This may seem to be a breathtakingly broad proposition, but its sweep
need not deter policymakers from beginning to work towards that goal.
They should do so by initiating three programs. First, policymakers should
construct a program of education and public relations designed to unmask
and explain the racialized history of gun rights in the United States, as well
as the broader socio-psycho-cultural forces that create and perpetuate racial
discrimination. Second, they should create public policy aimed at
eliminating systemic inequalities that have led to the entrenchment of an
impoverished, overwhelmingly non-white urban underclass routinely
stereotyped as a looming menace that must be defended against. Finally,
policymakers should emphasize community autonomy in determining the
most effective way to protect the community's members from guns and
other threats to public health and welfare.
A. Identity-Protective Reform
Professor Kahan's powerful argument for reframing the gun debate
turns on the idea that no real policy reform will be possible until each side is
able to describe and implement its proposals in a way that will not threaten
the deep cultural identity of the other side. 2 66 Implicit in that argument, of
course, is the concomitant notion that policy proposals likewise cannot
threaten or call into question the deep cultural identity of those who propose
them. In short, advocates on both sides of the debate must craft policy
proposals that respect and protect cultural identities that appear to be in
intractable opposition.267
Yet the racial conflict that informs and nurtures so much of the
mythology of American gun ownership 268 also provides an opportunity for
those who advocate restrictions on gun ownership and use to craft precisely
such an identity-protective proposal. First, such advocates must take
advantage of the nation's intense interest in Heller and begin a new
conversation about gun policy, focusing on the underlying cultural values
that have driven political conflicts over gun control. This revitalized
conversation must attend honestly and explicitly to racialized motivations
for gun ownership by Americans, illuminating the driving motivation
266. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
267. Id.
268. See supra Part IV.
[12:2008]
Much Ado About... Something Else
behind the desire to protect home and hearth-and, by extension, the desire
to protect cultural identity itself. For if that motivation derives both from an
aspiration for full, acknowledged membership in the American body politic
and from a perception of looming threat that itself derives from race-based
hatred or fear, then recognizing such membership and eliminating such
hatred or fear would eliminate the impetus for armament. An identity
grounded in veneration of the American frontier spirit and celebration of
full American citizenship might be protected without its proponents needing
to fire a single shot. Most importantly for gun-ravaged African American
communities, attempts at disarmament will not be met with the unparalleled
vehemence of threatened culture warriors.
Achieving such results will be a mammoth undertaking, the specifics of
which are beyond the scope of this article. What will be crucial, in the
context of the argument made here, is that advocates of reducing the
nation's gun violence be able to articulate not only the racialized elements
of the mythology of gun ownership, but also a vision of how and why an
identity grounded in other elements of that cultural story can be nourished in
the absence of racism. Assuming the truth of President Reagan's declaration
that "Americans don't go around carrying guns with the idea of using them
to influence other Americans," 269 eliminating racially grounded motivations
for gun ownership should facilitate a reformed and revitalized gun policy
that protects cultural identities-and lives-on both sides of the debate.
B. Community-Protective Autonomy
Moving the nation beyond race-based hatred and fear and ensuring full
participation in the body politic for all Americans will not happen overnight.
As policymakers work toward that goal, courts should be respectful of the
efforts of individual communities, such as the District of Columbia, to
protect their own identities by crafting the gun policy most appropriate for
their community. 2 70 The extent to which courts are willing to do so, in light
of Heller's holding, is likely to be one of the true legacies of the case.271
Communities emerge from and incarnate cultural identities just as
individuals do. And, just as Professor Kahan urges policymakers to respect
individuals' desire to preserve those identities, so courts should respect and
defer to the same desire in states and local governments in questions
pertaining to gun violence. In both situations, policymakers and courts
should be attentive to the role that race has played and continues to play in
creating and sustaining cultural values, including the values that inform
269. Quoted in Leonardatos, supra note 231, at 972.
270. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 1285 S. Ct. 2783, 2847 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271. See NAACP amicus brief, supra note 68, at 27.
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relevant gun policy. For the predominantly black District of Columbia, then,
the choice to limit gun ownership, even with the understanding of gun
control's history of racial oppression, deserved significant judicial
respect.
272
It is true that community laws and regulations are simply "one piece of
a much larger puzzle" of nationwide gun violence and that an individual
community's laws, standing alone, may be insufficient to "solve this
puzzle." 273 Even so, and even where "the absence of regional regulations
permits guns to flow into [a community] from neighboring jurisdictions," 274
state and local governments should not be deprived of that most basic of the
police powers: to protect the health and welfare of their citizens. 275 The
deprivation of such a power is especially poignant in the case of the District
of Columbia, which has spent years seeking both statehood and a
meaningful voting presence in Congress.2 76 Disabled from influencing gun
policy at the national level, similarly situated localities should be granted
substantial deference in seeking to protect its citizens at the community
level.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent scholarship has taken a critical first step toward gun policy
reform by making clear that debates over gun control have always been
debates over competing cultural values; however, that scholarship has
stopped short of its most valuable conclusion. The competing cultural
values at stake in the gun debate have, at their core, an often unrecognized
racial conflict that extends back to the very founding of this nation. This
article has proposed that effecting meaningful reform to gun policy depends
first upon unmasking that racial conflict as a predominant motivating factor
272. Despite what Clayton Cramer has aptly described as the "racist roots of gun control."
Cramer, supra note 178, the predominantly black District of Columbia determined that the most
effective means of protecting its citizens from gun violence is through restrictions on ownership and
use; that community decision is worthy of significant respect. It bears noting that in its amicus brief
in Heller, the NAACP argued emphatically that the solution to the nation's history of racially
discriminatory application of gun control laws lies not in invalidating those laws themselves, but
rather in ensuring their enforcement in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause. NAACP
amicus brief, supra note 68, at 29-31. The brief emphasizes that Heller has made no colorable claim
that the District's regulations are "racially discriminatory in either origin or application." Id. at 3 1.
273. Id. at 25.
274. NAACP amicus brief, supra note 68, at 27.
275. See Heller, 1285 S. Ct. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276. See, e.g., Mary Beth Sheridan, Activists See Gains In Quest For Vote; After Setback, D.C.
Advocates Look to 2009, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at B01.
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within the American mythology of gun ownership. Attempts at reform must
then create systemic social change to eliminate that motivation. While doing
so presents an immense challenge for policymakers, Heller has the potential
to create fertile ground for a refrained and revitalized national discussion
and thus for political action. Whether that discussion is likely to happen is
unclear. In light of the brief, non-racialized popular analysis of the Heller
decision thus far, the likelihood of a transformative discourse may elude the
American polity for some time longer. However, by explicitly
acknowledging and addressing the race-based implications of the gun
debate, such a discussion would go far towards respecting divergent cultural
identities while ultimately preserving the lives of Americans on both sides
of that debate.
